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PREFACE
This final report summarizes two years of research on
analyzing procedures for the establishment of standards. The
research was sponsored by the Volkswagenwerk Foundation and
jointly carried out at the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis at Laxenburg and the Kernforschungszentrurn
Karlsruhe. The final report is meant to be both a problem-
oriented review of related work in the area of environmental
standard setting and an executive summary of the main research
done during the contract period. The final report is accompanied
by eleven technical reports which describe studies and findings
performed under the contract in more detail, and which have
been either published as IIASA Research Memoranda or as outside
publications, or were especially written for this report. These
technical reports are structured in four parts:
policy analyses of standard setting procedures;
decision and game theoretic models for standard
setting;
applications of decision game theoretic models to
specific standard setting problems;
biological basis for standard setting.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental Decision Making: A Time for Reevaluation
As a veteran of the Japanese environmental administration
recently noted in a discussion*, the 1950s and early 1960s
were "polluter's heaven" in Japan and in probably most
industrialized countries of the world. "The Environment" had
not yet become an issue of public debate. Government actions
to control industry and new technological developments con-
sisted largely of ex post facto measures in cases of obvious
damage or of individual plans for the conservation of special
areas (coastal zones, national parks). High economic growth
was the driving force behind government planning, and indus-
trial polluters had to pay a small price or none for the bur-
den they put on the environment. Following again the vivid
description of this Japanese official, the late sixties marked
the end of "polluter's heaven" and the beginning of "the
stormy days". Initiated through accidents and environmental
damage of a scale recently unpreceden~ea (e.g. the Torrey
Canyon accident, the Miniamata disease, PCB poisoning), public
concern about environmental pollution increased drastically.
Several court cases were resolved in favor of plaintiffs claim-
ing damages from environmental pollution against industry and
government. In most industrialized countries legislative action
was taken to respond to the increased public pressure to reduce
pollution and to preserve environmental conditions. The U.S.
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of 1969 is a prominent
example which has been followed by many other countries.
Environmental agencies, such as the EPA in the United States,
the State Pollution Control Authority in Norway, the Central
Unit on Environmental Pollution in the United Kingdom, and the
Environment Agency in Japan, were set up to mediate in the
growing conflict between environment and development interests.
But the stormy days only marked the beginning of what
should eventually become "polluter's hell", characterized by
the rise of citizens' movements, zealous administrative action,
and involvement of radical political groups in environmental
protests against large-scale governmental and industrial pro-
grams and operations. In this period a multitude of environ-
mental law suits were initiated, new and often stiff environ-
mental legislation, standards, and zoning decisions were made,
and environmental impact statement requirements were introduced.
Laws against strip mining, severe limits on S02 emissions from
fossil fuel power plants, radiation standards, car emission
standards began to put a heavy burden on the industry and
*~ Hashimoto, Director of the Air Preservation Bureau,
Environment Agency, Japan, in a discussion with IIASA members
on October 10, 1977.
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eventually on the economy as a whole as highlighted particularly
during the energy crisis. With standards set on car emissions
on the basis of environmental and health considerations, fuel
consumption of cars increased. Requirements of environmental
impact statements put considerable organizational and financial
burden on industrial and governmental institutions and led to
time delays in planning and operating new plants, particularly
in the energy sector. Inconsistencies in environmental regu-
lations were found after the initially zealous period of admin-
istrative action: Restricting one pollution source sometimes
would tend to produce more pollution of another kind (e.g.
restricting carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions from cars
increases sulfuric acid mist). Reduction in risks of one kind
could lead to increased risks of another (e.g. reducing popula-
tion risks from operating power plants may lead to higher
occupational risks).
When in the mid-seventies these effects of environmental
regulations became felt, governmental officials, environmental
researchers and administrators began to ask themselves some
new challenging questions: How well does environmental decision
making fulfill its task of mediating between environment and
development interests? How much does environmental regulation
actually cost? How much does the public actually benefit from
regulation?
Attempts at answering these questions bring up some
fundamental problems of governmental regulation and environmental
decision making:
problems of the role of regulation as such: How
much power should be given to regulatory agencies?
problems of scale: How do economic benefits of
scale compare with the often unprecedented risks
and hazards of large technologies?
problems of uncertainty in planning: How can the
risks and uncertainties in environmental decision
making be accounted for if the complexity and scale
of consequences prohibit traditional experimental
or incremental approaches?
problems of planning and regulations in the light
of conflicting opinions: How can scientific data,
their conflicting interpretations by experts, and
public beliefs be integrated in regulatory decision
making?
problems of conflicting interests and goals:
can the variety of interest groups and their
flicting objectives and values be taken into
in environmental regulation?
How
con-
account
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Recognition of these problem areas in environmental
regulation and decision making seemed to have changed the
initial ambition of environmental researchers and decision
makers, and attempts at reevaluating environmental decision
making are now underway. The Congress of the United States,
for example, has issued through EPA a series of studies on
exactly these questions, including studies on the implications
of environmental regulations upon energy production and con-
sumption (NRC, 1977, VI), on the quality of environmental
decision making in the EPA (NRC, 1977, II), and on environ-
mental monitoring (NRC, 1977, IV).
It is in this context of reevaluation of environmental
decision making that IIASA's research on standard setting
procedures has to be seen. Although standard setting is only
one of many environmental policy tools, it is used in this
study as a vehicle for analyzing some basic decision problems
of environmental decision making and for developing new
methodologies to aid environmental decision makers. The
fundamental questions that have motivated this research are
these: How are standards set at present? What are the main
problem areas in standard setting procedures? How can standard
setting procedures be improved?
Origin, Purpose, and Overview over IIASA's Research on Standard
Setting
While we can now put the study on standard setting pro-
cedures reported here in a wider context of national studies
for the evaluation of environmental decision making, our original
interest in standards was triggered off by a series of
modeling efforts in IIASA's Energy Systems Program (for an
overall description, see H~fele, 1976). Within the Program
so-called energy models have been developed to analyze present
and future supply and demand structures. Especially the nuclear
option was studied in greater detail (see H~fele and Manne, 1977).
As part of these studies an attempt was made to analyze all
(normal operating and accidental) risks and hazards involved in
the large-scale use of nuclear energy (see Avenhaus, H~fele,
and McGrath, 1977). This necessarily led to the question
which environmental burden from such an energy system
could be tolerated, and what the criteria for limiting
these (individual or societal) burdens should be.
In addition mixed (i.e. nuclear and non-nuclear) energy strat-
egies were analyzed in which environmental constraints were taken
into account. Nordhaus (1975) developed a two-sector model with
a constraint for the upper limit of the global carbon dioxide
content. Agnew, Schrattenholzer, and Voss (1978) analyzed the
consequences of different standards for S02' NO , and others on
the cost of alternative energy systems. AE tha~ level nothing
was said about the appropriate, i.e. socially acceptable,
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numerical inputs in the form of standards or the like as con-
straints for such models. They were simply treated as parameters
of the problem as was done by other modeling groups (see, for
example, Hoffmann, 1973).
It was quite natural not to stop at that point, and to
determine equilibrium states and cost optimal strategies for
parametrically fixed constraints. The question was how to reach
such equilibrium states under given social conditions, consider-
ing the institutional and political realities of environmental
decision making and regulations, and in particular, the
realities of standards and standard setting procedures. On
this path we ended up with virtually the same types of issues
and questions of environmental decision making as described
earlier.
It was clear from the beginning that investigation of the
political and social nature of standard setting required new
analytical tools. Under study was a problem of public policy
making under uncertainty and with conflicting interest groups
and objectives, with risks and impacts of a large scale, and
with only limited possibilities for traditional experimental
and incremental approaches. The initial literature survey on
analytical approaches and procedures for standard setting
suggested possible research directions:
policy analyses;
environmental economics;
cost-benefit approaches;
simulation gaming approaches;
decision theoretic approaches;
game theoretic approaches.
These approaches are discussed briefly in the next section of
this report. Here it is sufficient to say that, based on the
expertise of the researchers involved in IIASA's standard
setting studies, and based on our judgement of the possible
limits and benefits of the different analytical study approaches,
several initial decisions were made. First of all, it was
decided to closely study the standard setting procedures at
the hand of actual cases, and as far as possible in an inter-
action with real decision makers. Secondly, two main lines of
case-oriented research evolved: policy analyses of ongoing or
past standard setting processes with a largely problem-oriented
and descriptive focus; and decision and game theoretic models
with a more normative emphasis on aiding regulatory decision
makers in standard setting tasks.
-5-
The policy analyses were meant to provide the case
material, to describe how standards are set at present, to
identify problem areas in standard setting, and to provide
inputs into the decision and game theoretic modeling efforts.
A policy analysis framework was elaborated by Fischer (1978,
TR-2*) and applied to two standard setting cases: the United
Kingdom and Norwegian standards for chronic oil discharges
for North Sea production platforms, and the Japanese noise
standards for superrapid trains, such as the Shinkansen (see
Fischer and v. Winterfeldt, TR-3; v. Winterfeldt, 1978, TR-4).
In each case in-depth interviews were held with the parties
involved in the standard setting process, including members
of the environmental agencies, other governmental agencies and
ministries, industrial representatives, and environmentalists.
Besides these largely problem-oriented and qualitative
policy analyses, decision and game theoretic models were
developed. Decision theory and game theory both are appro-
priate analytical tools for problems with multiple decision
makers, uncertainty, and multiple objectives. A decision
theoretic model for emission and safety standards setting was
developed by v. Winterfeldt (1978, TR-5,6), which comprises
the decision making of a regulator, developer (producer), and
impactee. The purpose of the model was to provide both a
structure and quantification possibilities for the regulator
to perform his information processing and evaluation tasks
when setting standards. The model was applied to the chronic
oil discharge case using some of the policy analyses inputs
from the case study (see v. Winterfeldt, 1978, TR-8). The
multistage nature of the standard setting process, possible
feedbacks between the decision making units, and the learning
process involved let to an extension of the static three
decision makers model. HOpfinger and Avenhaus (1978, TR-7)
extended the decision theoretic model into a multistage game
theoretic model. The purpose of this model was to parametrically
explore the possible futures of a dynamic standard setting
process in which several decision makers with different inter-
ests and objectives interact. In this model transitions from
one stage of the decision process to another are uncertain,
either because of an uncertain environment or because of the
unpredictability of the responses of the decision makers
involved. Such models can be mainly descriptive in character
(i.e. they can simulate a sequence of decisions), or normative
if a given solution concept is being provided, e.g. equilibrium
points or Pareto optimal solutions. The game theoretic models
were applied to noise standards for Shinkansen trains and CO2
standards (see HOpfinger and v. Winterfeldt, 1978, TR-10; ana
HOpfinger, 1978, TR-9).
*All reports designated TR- are contained in Volume II of this
report, "Procedures for the Establishment of Standards,
Technical Reports".
It should be mentioned that during the two years of work
not all original ideas could be realized. For example, only
normal operating lO$as (in connection with emission standards)
were studied in detail, while questions of risks and safety
standards were only touched upon in the decision theoretic
model. Also, more general questions of environmental regula-
tions, such as the statutory framework, alternative analytical
methods for standard setting procedures, or institutional
aspects of standard setting were only considered in the initial
review phase of the study (see Majone, 1978, TR-l).
STANDARD SETTING: PROBLEMS AND ANALYTICAL APPROACHES
Standards and Alternative Environmental Policy Tools
Before going into the detailed discussion of standards
and standard setting procedures, it is useful to back up a
little and consider the variety of environmental policy tools
of which standard setting is only a small, but important, part.
Environmental policy tools range from banning products or
operations, over emission taxes, incentives, subsidies,
emission and ambient standards, zoning, to procedural rules
(contained in environmental impact statements, for example), and
institutional rules (concerning, for instance, public partici-
pation). An example of this range of alternatives was provided
in v. Winterfeldt's (1978, TR-4) study of noise regulation for
high speed trains. Figure 1 presents some logical alternatives
for setting noise standards. These alternatives alone are only
a small segment of the full range of regulatory means and inter-
ventions to reduce railway noise. Just an attempt at putting
all of these together would have quickly made a bushy mess out
of the tree in Figure 1.
Also, there are different types of standards. To name
only a few:
environmental quality standards (usually ambient
concentrations or population doses);
enforcement standards (mainly emission standards);
safety standards (usually engineering design criteria);
product performance standards (e.g. milage limita-
tions for cars);
product design standards (e.g. seat belts);
work practice standards (e.g. factory temperature) .
Out of this range of alternatives this study is mainly con-
cerned with emission standards and only touches on ambient
and safety standards. In a review of environmental policy
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tools and their evaluation, Majone (1978), however, covered a
wider range. He classified such policy tools into three
categories:
market approaches (taxes, incentives);
regulation (standards, licensing, zoning);
direct intervention (construction of public sewage
facilities, banning of certain activities).
Majone critically discussed and evaluated these different types
of environmental policy tools, considering their efficiency,
equity, and institutional feasibility. In less technical terms,
the questions he addressed were; Are the tools cost-effective?
Do they distribute costs and benefits in a fair way? Are they
adapted to institutional or political reality? Some of Majone's
conclusions are worth summarizing here:
There are no fail-safe policy tools, whose perfor-
mance may be assessed solely on the basis of their
technical-economic properties. The actual outcomes
of environmental policies are influenced more by
the institutional arrangements, and by people's
attempts to manipulate them in their own interests,
than by the technical characteristics of the instru-
ment used. Standards and other types of regulatory
policy have been criticized for being amenable to
bargaining and political compromise. The closed
model of environmental decision making shows that
the same or similar behavior patterns can be
expected to be present, and have in fact been
observed, where market approaches to pollution
control are used.
There is no way of reconciling equity with effici-
ency considerations. The multiplicity of equity
constraints rules out the possibility of first-
best solutions (emission taxes or effluent charges);
and it-is even difficult to perceive the distin-
guishing features of the second best position
(the approach of combined standards and charges
comes closest to such a characterization) .
Direct regulation is, and will remain, an essential
component of environmental policies. This state-
ment can be supported by at least three groups of
considerations: institutional, informational, and
administrative. Institutionally, the process of
standard setting is well adapted to political and
administrative realities, in a way in which pollu-
tion charges and rights, for example, are not.
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From the point of view of information requirements
standards--being essentially empirical guidelines
that summarize the scientific and economic evidence
available--can be used without the precise know-
ledge of costs, damage, and benefits that is
required by more sophisticated methods.
Administratively, direct regulation is unavoid-
able when quick action must be taken in response
to sudden emergencies or to environmental situa-
tions that may result in irreparable damage, or
to avoid unfavorable long-run developments that
could not be checked on the basis of simple cost-
benefit considerations.
Standard setting is a political process, con-
strained by requirements of internal consistency,
and of compatability with known scientific and
economic facts. Recognition of the political
character of the process does not rule out the
possibility of improvement through analysis. It
does imply, however, that the relevant analysis
must be different from that which is applicable
to the paradigm of individual decision making.
Specifically, the goal of the analysis can no
longer be the search for optimal decisions, by
algorithms or other means, but should be the
design of improved procedures for argumentation
and collective decision making. If it is true
that "the most formidable barrier to controlling
pollution is probably not technology, population,
or public attitudes but the politics of power"
(Freeman, Haveman, and Kneese, 1973, page 170),
it seems rather pointless to advocate policies
that essentially deny the political character of
environmental problems.
In short, the study of standard setting procedures began
with the precepts that:
standards are one of the most commonly used regu-
latory tools, well adapted to the institutional
realities;
standard setting is an inherently political process;
methods for improving standards are needed and
require new methodological and institutional
approaches.
Before we discuss some such approaches, the next section will
first look into the actual tasks and problems a regulatory
decision maker typically faces when setting emission, ambient,
or safety standards.
-19-
Standard Setting Tasks and Difficulties
Let us consider for a moment an administrator in an environ-
mental agency who has recognized that new production platforms
for offshore oil production involve the hazards of operational
oily water emissions of a scale and concentration which may
endanger the balance of the marine ecology and lead to mortal-
ity and chronic toxity of fish and possibly even to an accumu-
lation of hydrocarbons in the food chain. This regulator has
just completed the first task in the long chain of tasks when
setting a standard: he has identified the hazard, its source,
and surveyed its potential impacts. But there still is a long
road ahead of him (a rough estimate of two years of study is
probably not exaggerated) before he finally can issue an order
in which standards are specified.
First of all, there is the question of sources and amounts
of pollution. This is a relatively easy task in the chronic
oil case (see also Fischer and v. Winterfeldt, 1978, TR-2), but
one has only to consider oxidants or carbon dioxide to realize
that the problem of amounts and sources is no trivial matter.
(See Environment Agency, 1976; Williams, 1978). Polluters are
quick to point to other sources of comparable or larger impacts
(for example natural hydrocarbon seepage in the seas). Amount
estimates vary from expert to expert and between government,
industry, and independent researchers. In the chronic oil case
estimates of total amounts of oil entering the North Sea from
chronic oil pollution differed by a factor of 5. The regulator
for the first time faces a problem which he will encounter over
and over again in the following months: conflicting opinions,
conflicting assumptions, conflicting probabilities, and conflicting
estimates.
Next, the problem of pollution abatement technology, and
the question of its cost and performance arises. The
regulator quickly sees the limits of his own (and not infrequently
of the inhouse governmental) research capability. In technologi-
cal questions he usually has to rely on equipment manufacturers
and on industrial sources. Again he faces conflicting data:
Manufacturers cite good performance and low costs, often
neglecting costs for installing peripheral equipment. Indus-
trial representatives tend to give high cost estimates, cite
worse equipment performance, and question the feasibility of
equipment. A typical case is again derived from the North
Sea study: Manufacturers cited performance figures of oily
water treatment which often were lower by a factor of 2 than
those of the field studies of the industry and environmental
agencies.
Next comes the question of effects and impacts. At this
stage the regulator may find himself in one of several binds.
If the problem is setting safety regulations (for instance, for
preventing blowouts from oil production and drilling platforms) ,
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the task becomes one of estimating low probabilities of
failures and accidents and of assessing the range of consequen-
ces of these accidents. Here the main uncertainties are in the
initial event, and to a lesser degree in the impacts. In
normal operating losses of industrial operations the uncertain-
ties are reversed: The initiating event is known, but the fate
and turnover, synergistic effects, and cumulative long-term
effects of low concentration pollution on the affected environ-
ment and ultimately on human health may be very uncertain (see
also Sagan and Affifi, 1978, TR-ll). Chronic oil discharges
are again a good example. Although the regulatory agencies
in the United Kingdom and Norway know the levels of oil pollu-
tion from production platforms, they have only vague ideas
about the effects of oil on the marine environment. An example
of a double bind is CO2 emission, which leads to the possibility
of a catastrophic climatic change (see e.g. Williams, 1978). In
this case neither the probabilities of such an event nor the
ultimate nature or consequences of the climatic changes are
well known.
Now let us assume that our hypothetical regulator has
muddled through the previous tasks of identifying the sources
and amounts of pollution, covering a range of possible hazards
and risks, and estimating possible effects on the environment.
The next step is most critical: to evaluate alternative policy
tools, standard measures, and standard levels, within light of
his (explicit or implicit) objectives. In the rational paradigm
of decision making, this task involves complete specification
of objectives and possible alternatives to achieve them. The
regulator may consider the availability and performance of
equipment as a main criterion of choice among standards (as
is very often done; see, for example, CUEP, 1976; EPA, 1975) to
rely on pollution equipment control for what technologies are
available. On the other hand he may decide to solely rely on
environmental or health criteria for selecting a standard in
cases where good knowledge about the dose-response relationship
exists. This in fact is the idea behind "environmental quality
standards", which are usually ambient standards considered as
environmental targets. Besides such technical and environmental
criteria, the regulator may also consider equipment costs or
larger scale economic impacts of regulation.
But often more than just environmental, economic and
engineering aspects are to be considered. The international
community may exert pressure on the regulator to enforce strict
standards because the pollution he intends to limit also affects
other countries (this was certainly the case with the chronic
oil discharge standards; other examples are: the Rhine pollu-
tion, sulfur dioxide pollution which carries across borders,
the Mediterranean, etc.). The regulator may be bound by the
national governmental policy (e.g. high national economic
growth) or the statutory framework defining environmental
policy (for example, by asking for the "best practicable" or
"best technical" means for pollution control). And, to conclude
this list of potential political objectives, the regulator may
be concerned about actions and responses from industry and from
-12-
environmentalists. For example, in the noise regulation case
of the Japanese Environment Agency, one main concern was to
reduce the number of complaints about train noise. This case
also provided a wide range of possible objectives. In the
policy analysis study by v. Winterfeldt (1978, TR-4) an attempt
was made to delineate all the objectives that the environment
agency might have considered when setting noise standards.
These include nine objectives reffecting the railway side
(e.g. maintain speed, comfort, safety and reliability of trains,
minimize investment and operation cost), six environmental
objectives (e.g. minimize disturbance to residential areas,
minimize direct harmful effects such as aggravation of existing
illnesses), and finally, five political objectives of the nature
discussed in the previous paragraph (e.g. requce the number of
complaints about noise, meet international standards, fit into
national environmental policy framework).
Given these objectives, what are the regulatory means to
achieve them? One could think in terms of standards that the
regulator merely has to select a numerical value which charac-
terizes the upper limits of emission, ambient concentrations
of a chemical or of noise, etc. But there are many more alter-
natives in standard setting as the noise regulation case (see
Figure 1) has shown. The regulator has to take a series of
crucial decisions, among which the actual numerical level of
the standard is only one of many. The first step is to define
one or more quantities (measures) indicative of the pollution
level. For example:
emission concentration averaged over a month~
maximum emission level on a single day~
average ambient concentration at a certain distance
from a source~
composition measures such as basic oxygen demand~
individual or population doses.
Next he has to determine an analytical procedure for measuring
pollution levels. This is no trivial matter either. Noise
metering instruments can have quite different readings depending
on their technical characteristics, even if they are meant to
measure the same quantity, e.g. decibel. In the chronic oil
pollution study the regulator had recognized that different
devices for measuring oil concentration in the effluent could
result in readings differing by more than ten percent. In the
nuclear industry, standards for permissible plutonium concen-
trations in air and water had been set which could, for a long
time, not be measured at all.
Next the standard level has to be considered. But a simple
numerical level does not do. The regulator has to define the
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limit. For example, it can mean that the average readings of
one month based on four daily samples are not to exceed a
given limit. Or it can mean that no single sample on any day
may exceed the limit. The study of chronic oil discharges
clearly demonstrated the influence of such definitions on the
industry's decision making in the decision theoretic model
(see v. Winterfeldt, 1978, TR-8).
Furthermore, the regulator has alternative means for
implementing standards by defining monitoring and inspection
procedures, sanctions, and enforcement schemes. It makes no
sense to set a standard and not to enforce it. Standards are
set to change the operations of an industrial polluter or to
reduce the risks of some technology. If there is no inspec-
tion or no enforcement, little will change. Again this effect
showed very clearly both in the policy study on chronic oil
pollution and in the decision theoretic model, which made this
aspect a crucial part of the analysis.
Usually not all possible alternatives and objectives are
considered in standard setting, and those which remain are
seldom spelled out explicitly. In any case, the crucial final
task has to then be performed in the light of the information
available, the objectives, and alternatives: the evaluation
of alternative standards and the final agreement on a standard.
This task involves many problems:
some objectives cannot be operationalized:
some consequences may not be commensurable:
trade-offs among conflicting interests and objec-
tives are extremely difficult to make;
conflicting probabilities and opinions have to be
taken into account;
trade-offs have to be made between short-term bene-
fits and costs and long-term impacts of regulation.
All this has to be done under often severe time pressure, with
lobbyists and interest groups at the front door, and experts
still fighting over the interpretation of their studies. Will
it be a "rational" decision?
Analytical Approaches to Standard Setting
Most likely it will not. Recognition of the inade-
quacies of environmental regulatory decision making has
therefore led to several attempts at analytically studying
-14-
standard setting procedures and to suggest formal or institu-
tional innovations for improving standard setting. Among these
are:
policy analyses;
environmental economics;
cost-benefit analyses;
simulation gaming approaches;
decision theoretic approaches;
game theoretic approaches.
Since policy analysis approaches and the decision and game
theoretic approaches--the study tools selected in this research--
will be treated in detail later, we will only briefly touch on
the alternative tools not explored in detail, i.e., economic
analyses, cost-benefit analyses, and simulation games.
Economic analyses are divided into two main study approaches:
theoretical studies on the efficiency of alternative pollution
control measures (e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1975; Kneese and Bower,
1968; Oates, 1972; M~ler, 1974) and actual studies on the
national economic impacts of environmental regulation (e.g. NRC,
1977, VI; Environment Agency, 1977). In his review for this
report (TR-l), Majone discusses the first type of studies, some
of the results, and the limits of the economic analysis of
the pollution problem. To give a simplified version of the
economic approach, consider the decision making of a firm under
free competition. Since the firm's decision making is oriented
towards minimizing investment and operational costs, and the
determination of optimal production schemes under free competi-
tion, it will neglect the costs and burden its production will
impose on the environment (and its users) unless these costs
and burdens are internalized into the investment and operational
costs. To follow Majone again, consider the case of a chemical
factory producing product P and discharging its waste into a
nearby river, or polluting the air. These discharges reduce
the quality of the environment and its suitability for a number
of alternative uses. Since water and air are common property,
their services (in this case the services of carrying off
wastes) are not sold. The cost of reduced environmental quality
is thus overlooked by the price system, and failure to account
for such cost leads to an oversupply of P and an under supply of
the benefits which are reduced by pollution. This is the
efficiency problem. If the damage cost of pollution were inter-
nalized, resources would be used more efficiently: the price
of P would be higher, less P would be produced, and pollution
would be abated.
The solution environmental economists offer to the efficiency
problem is to internalize pollution cost to the firm by imposing
-15-
adequate taxation schemes or by providing pollution rights.
The regulatory agency would set a charge or price equal to the
marginal damage for each unit of waste, thus forcing polluters
to decrease their wasre flows as long as the marginal cost of
doing so was less than the price for discharging, settling at
the optimum where marginal treatment costs are equal to the
charge.
Majone points out several problems with this approach,
both on the theoretical side and with respect to practical
implementation. Perhaps the most persuasive implementation
problems can be illustrated in the following (not totally
hypothetical) example. A city council imposes effluent
charges on a firm emitting a flow of pollutant X. After some
years of adjusting its production according to the taxation
scheme, the firm develops a new technology which would allow
it to drastically reduce the rate of pollution, with the
reduction in taxation making up for the investment and opera-
tion costs of the new equipment. But rather than maintaining
the charges scheme (which should be independent of technologies
and only consider marginal damage from pollution), the city
council now fears to lose a substantial amount of revenue and
quickly reduces its charges. After this reduction, it is no
more cost efficient for the firm to install the new equipment.
It will continue with the previous production scheme, the same
amounts of pollution, but reduced charges.
This may be a somewhat drastic example, but it illustrates
some of the difficulties with the charge systems. Other diffi-
culties are, of course, the setting of the charge scheme itself,
the estimation of the net damage, taking into account uncertain-
ties, etc. For these reasons environmental economists have
attempted to develop "second best" solutions, e.g. the charge
and standard approach (see, e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1975). Such
schemes assume standards and attempt to set a price system by
which to achieve these standards rather than basing them on
unknown damage functions (see Majone, 1977). For a discussion
of these second best approaches and of alternative studies on
environmental economics, we refer here only to the literature
cited (see also Pethig, 1978).
Several attempts have been made in recent years to
estimate the economic consequences of regulations and standards.
In particular, studies have been performed to determine the
investment and operation costs of governments regulation,
impacts on GNP and employment, etc. Good examples are studies
of the u.s. National Research Council (1977, VI) and the
Japanese Environment Agency (1977). The general framework for
such an analysis is given in Figure 2. The NRC study estimated
"incremental annual expenditures made pursuant to Federal
pollution control legislation relating to health and environ-
ment to be 14 to 30 billion (1974) dollars for 1975 or one to
two percent of the GNP". In Japan similar estimates also lie
-16-
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Figure 2. Framework for analysis of the economic impact of
environmental regulativ.
Source: Environment Agency, 1977
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in the area of one to two percent of the GNP. With respect
to the full impact of environmental regulation on national
economic growth, the Japanese study comes to a very interesting
conclusion: "As the increase in demand resulting from the
income effect of the pollution abatement investments is expected
to cancel the demand decrease to be caused by its price effects,
the pollution abatement investments are expected to have no
substantial impact on the average national economic growth ..• "
These numbers say little, of course, about the financial
burden put on various industrial sectors. Here, the picture
for the next ten years, for example in Japan, may look a
little dimmer. For example, the Environment Agency estimates
that in 1975 pollution abatement investments accounted for
8.7 percent of the total private investment, and that partic-
ularly the petroleum and the coal industry may be affected in
the future by environmental regulation. For 1985 the two
industries are estimated to have a pollution abatement stock
of 34 percent as compared to the total private investment
stock, followed by the pulp and paper industry (32 percent)
and the ceramics industry (22 percent).
Whether these figures are typical is not the question here.
They are meant to illustrate the overall macroeconomic approach
to analyzing the effects of environmental control and regula-
tions on the national economy.
Cost-benefit anaLysis. Cost-benefit analysis is a more
practical approach in evaluating environmental decision making
that grew out of environmental economics. In its most tradi-
tional form, cost-benefit analysis would determine all the costs
accruing from, say, standards (for example, investment cost of
treatment, operation costs) and the benefits resulting from
regulation (for example in reducing health hazards, risks,
effects on ecology, etc). Criteria of choice among policy
tools are then cost-benefit ratios or the like. Examples of
environmental cost-benefit analyses are Dorfman and Jacoby
(1975) for water pollution abatement decisions; North and
Merkhofer (1975) for regulations for coal-fired power plants;
Templeton, McAuliffe, and Murphy for oil discharge regulations
(1977); and various other applications in Karam and Morgan (1975).
~1.hile the cost of regulations is usually relatively easy
to quantify in monetary terms, the quantification of the bene--
fits of regulation (or the damage from pollution) is by no
means easy. Quantification approaches include the willing-
ness-to-pay approach or other revealed or expressed trade-off
approaches. These are critically reviewed, for instance, in
Fischoff (1977), and Pearce (1976). Other limits of cost-
benefit analysis are that it does not take into account uncer-
tainties and risks (see Pearce, 1976), and that it cannot
incorporate distributional effects and equity considerations.
A study of the National Academy of Sciences (1975) there-
fore concluded that:
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"There is no scientific formula for making regulatory
decisions ... There is no satisfactory way to summarize
all the costs and benefits of regulatory options in
dollars or other terms which can be added, subtracted,
or compared. In short, there is no substitute for
experienced decision makers exercising good judgment."
(page 2)
The same report, however, expressed cautious optimism with
respect to the less rigid applications of formal analysis as
possible decision aids for regulatory agencies:
"However, the techniques developed by decision theory
and benefit-cost analysis can provide the decision
maker with a useful framework and language for de-
scribing and discussing trade-offs, noncommensurabil-
ities, and uncertainty. They can also help to clar-
ify the existence of alternatives, decision points,
gaps in information, and value judgments concerning
trade-offs. .. (page 3)
Gaming is one such approach to overcome the problem that
regulatory decision makers have little chance of testing their
ideas before taking major decisions. This problem will be
urgent when trial and error methods are too disruptive and
too costly. Other approaches are given by simulation and game
theory. A simulation involves the representation of a system
by another system that purports to have a relevant similarity
to the original system. The simulator is usually simpler than
the system being simulated and more amenable to analysis and
manipulation. Thus a simulation is a model giving answers to
specialized sets of questions about the behavior of the system.
Gaming, in constrast to simulation, employs human beings
in some actual or simulated role. Furthermore, players may
be experimental subjects under observation or they may be
participating in the exercise for instruction or training. An
illustrative example is business gaming which is an instruc-
tional vehicle based on situations specifically designed to
represent the actual business world conditions. It enables
the participant to test his decisions within a realistic and
often competitive environment since most structures make use
of teams or have individuals compete to increase sales, cut
costs, etc. Game theory, furthermore, provides the language
for describing conscious goal-oriented decision making processes
involving more than one individual.
Since the effects of special pollution and the scope of its
regulation can often be understood only in a broad context, it
seems worthwhile to provide the staff of regulating authorities
and perhaps managers in industry with a special training on
pollution and its regulation, which of course can be done with
a gaming model.
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For example, a gaming model on pollution was developed by
the firm "Industrianlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft m.b.H." in
Ottobrunn, FRG. The result was "Remus: Rechnergestfttztes
Entscheidungsmodell zur Umweltsimulation" (a computerized
decision model on environmental simulation) by Birr et al
(1975). It serves as an aid to deciding on regulatory measure.
Furthermore, it should demonstrate the effects of measures,
scheduled or already carried out, on environment, economy, and
on public enterprise. It is planned as a general regional
model in which spatial units such as rivers, agricultural
regions, and regions of high population density are part of
the system. It also considers economic activities in inter-
action with pollution.
Remus is a multistage model with at most 20 stages. A
stage represents one year. There are three groups of players:
industry;
governmental planning unit;
governmental decision unit.
During each stage the three groups choose measures concerning
that stage only. These measures relate to four sections:
industry, government, population, and environment; the sections
"industry" and "government" are represented by groups of players.
The groups' objectives are not formulated as utility functions
defined on the consequences or action.
Population changes are represented by numerical changes,
including migration, which is governed by an index of attrac-
tiveness of a region. The main components are environment,
infrastructure, state of local labor market, state of recreation
facilities, and habitat.
During one stage the industry groups and the governmental
groups choose their measures independently, whereas in the
governmental group first the planning unit and then the deci-
sion unit make their choice. The developers of the model
intend to elaborate the various levels of decision makers
within government and population and to improve the information
obtained during gaming.
The approach chosen by Birr et al is, of course, only one
of many gaming approaches. An alternative which relies more on
human judgment and on structuring the environment-development
problem, for example, is the simulation gaimng approach developed
by Helmer (1978). (For an overall review of gaming and simula-
tion gaming approaches, see Shubik, 1975a and b).
While gaming can explore futures of environmental decision
making and their consequences directly involving other decision
makers or "players", it says little about:
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the structure of environmental decision problems;
the source and nature of conflicting opinions and
values of players;
possible optimal solutions to environmental regu-
lation in the light of uncertainty and value conflicts.
But in a situation such as standard setting, which apart
from different active "players", also involves experts, exoge-
nous pressures, and uncertainties, one may wish to explore in
more detail the problems of the decision making processes in
regulation, the sources of opinion and value conflicts, and
possible solution strategies. For exactly these reasons our
studies concentrated on the three remaining analytical approaches:
poZicy anaZysis for problem identification, and
identification of major actors, values, and alter-
natives in standard setting problems, with the main
goal of structuring the environmental decision
process;
decision theory and decision anaZysis for quanti-
fying the major decision variables, uncertainties,
and values in standard setting with the main goal
of analyzing the sensitivities in regulatory deci-
sion making;
and finally, game theory to explore in a multi-
stage process different solution concepts for
regulation.
POLICY ANALYSIS OF STANDARD SETTING PROBLEMS
A Policy Analysis Framework for Standard Setting
The policy analysis framework used in this study was
developed by Fischer (1978, TR-2) in a refinement of an approach
used in previous studies of environment-development decision
making (see Keith and Fischer, 1976). These refinements con-
sisted largely in an adaptation of the original policy analysis
framework to standard setting and in the use of some structural
tools from decision theory, namely goal trees (see Keeney
and Raiffa, 1976) and decision trees (see Raiffa, 1968).
The purpose of this policy analysis approach is to
understand a specific decision making process in standard
setting. This includes a structuring of the decision makers
and actors involved in standard setting, their organization,
information interlinkages (both formal and informal), the
objectives and values of the actors, and their alternative
means and instruments for achieving these objectives. Besides
providing an understanding of environment-development decision
-21-
making systems policy analysis also can provide a framework for
comparing the decision making in different countries (as was
done in the North Sea study by Fischer and v. Winterfeldt, 1978,
TR-3), and to some degree also help evaluate the decision
making process. Interviews and background literature provide
the main data base for such policy analysis.
Fischer's policy analysis framework begins with a defini-
tion of the concept of actors. In application to standard
setting processes, the policy analysis uncovered several
generic actor groupings which can be characterized as follows:
Development Actors
objective: profit or service potential;
reason for involvement: generation of energy or products
via approved technology.
Regulatory Actors
objective: assimilate opposing demands and approve technology;
reason for involvement: legislative/administrative authority.
Environmental Expert Actors
objective: professional and personal interests;
reason for involvement: recognition of impacts.
Impactees
objective: preservation
reason for involvement:
come of development.
of environment/livelihood;
dissatisfaction with potential out-
Exogeneous Actors
objective: preservation
reason for involvement:
of environment/energy systems;
treaty, international influence.
A convenient way of initially structuring the interrelation-
ships between actors was found to be a representation of these
five actor groups as shown in Figure 3.
The actual organizational setup is the next step of the
policy analysis. Here the main formal and informal inter-
connections between the actor groups identified are constructed.
Figure 4 presents an example of the organizations and actors
involved in the standard setting process for chronic oil dis-
charges from North Sea production platforms. Interconnections
represent lines of advice, information exchange, approval, and
control. Following the definition of actors, their organiza-
tions, and their interlinks, the next step of the policy analy-
sis is to structure the potential values and objectives of the
three main actor groups--the regulator, the developer, and
the impactee--by means of goal trees. Finally, the policy
analysis attempts to outline possible alternative strategies
•
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and instruments of these three actor groups by menas of alter-
native or decision trees.
The previous steps of the policy analysis framework for
standard setting defined the eZements of the standard setting
process, and are an attempt to cover a wide span of possibZe
actors, objectives, and alternatives. The final analysis
attempts to first describe in detail the actual information
collection, processing, and evaluation in standard setting
and to reflect this real process against the outlined objec-
tives, alternatives, and actors. Questions raised here are:
Which actors were included in the decision making
process and how?
Which actors were excluded and why?
Which objectives (of those outlines in the tree)
were actually considered, and with what priority?
Which alternatives (of those spanned in the tree)
were actually considered and how?
Which alternatives were excluded and why?
Which information was used for standard setting?
Attempts can be made on that basis to reflect on the possible
inconsistencies, lack of information use, lack of information
exchange, exclusion of certain actors or alternatives in the
standard setting process. These can then be useful to compare
across different countries and to provide a basis for further
evaluation within a given country.
The policy analysis approach is qualitative and problem
oriented with a non-rigid methodology. It helps the analyst
to quickly orient himself in a real world problem and gives a
rough structure of the situation. However, it should be noted
that such an analysis can never do more than portraying a
qualitative picture of the standard setting process perhaps
tainted through the perceptions of the interviewees and the
analysts. There is no assurance that a different analyst who
takes up the same analysis will end up with the same results
and conclusions. This lack of intersubjectivity is both a
strength and a weakness. It is a strength because it allows
a deeper understanding through the direct involvement of the
analyst, a flexible approach, and a possibly more perceptive
and insightful analysis which could not be provided by standard-
ized questionaires or data collection methods. It is a weak-
ness b~cause it opens itself to numerous judgments and biases
on the side of those interviewed and of the analyst, who then
in turn will have to face criticisms of silent assumptions,
biases, or misunderstandings. Both these strengths and weak-
nesses fully applied in the two following policy analyses of
-25-
chronic oil discharge and noise regulation. Particularly in
the chronic oil discharge case, the United Kingdom representa-
tives argued quite strongly against some of the evalutions
and comparisons between Norway and the united Kingdom. One
should therefore read the following summaries of these studies,
keeping in mind both the strengths and the weaknesses of the
policy analysis framework.
The Chronic oil Dischqrge Study
The study of chronic (operational) oil discharges from
North Sea production platforms was the more detailed policy
analysis of this project. In-depth interviews were held with
members of the departments of energy and environment in the
United Kingdom and Norway and with industry representatives and
researchers, and close contacts were established between the
IIASA team and the regulatory agencies. The IIASA team visited
the United Kingdom and Norway twice during this study, and
delegations of the United Kingdom and Norwegian regulators
carne to IIASA during a workshop held partly on the issue of
operational oil discharges.
The problem of chronic oil discharges from North Sea
production platforms arose with the growing oil development in
the North Sea. Production platforms discharge, as part of their
routine operations, certain amounts of oily water (up to 200,000
barrels a day) with an oil content of up to 100 ppm (parts per
million). Both the United Kingdom and Norwegian governments
were in the process of setting discharge standards on oil
concentration when in December 1976 the IIASA study team began
to look into the problem.
Figures 5 and 6 show the first step of our analysis, the
determination of the actor configurations in the United Kingdom
and Norway. Although many organizational units are identical
but have different names, one difference appears quite obvious:
in the United Kingdom the standard setting for chronic oil
discharges is put in the hands of the Department of Energy,
while in Norway it rests within the Department of Environment.
Figure 7 presents an example of an alternative tree that
shows the developer's choices for treating chronic oil discharges.
To give an example of the goal tree structuring approach,
Figure 8 illustrates the goals for protecting the marine
environment under the explicit formulations of the United
Kingdom Central Unit on Environmental Pollution. Objectives
of the developers were mainly cost oriented, while the regu-
lator appeared to have objectives (or rather: constraints)
determined by international and national legislation and other
standards (for example, agreements by the Paris Convention on
Oil Pollution) .
UK OFFSHOREi
OPERATOR'S I
ASSOCIATION
CENTRAL UNIT!
O~ ENVIRONMENTAL!
PO~~UTI()N I
DEPT.OFI
MINISTRY OF\ ENVIRONMENT I
AGRICULTURE \
FISHERY AND FOODl\ .
MARINE
RESEARCH
INSTITUTE
LOCAL WATER I
. /AUTHORITIES
PETROLEUMI
,REGULATOR 1---+ P_RODUCTION/
\
DIVISION/,
(DEPT. OF ENER~Y) I
MARINE DIVISION 1\
(DEPT. OF TRADE) .
NATURE CONSERVANCY
COUNCILr
NATN'L I
ENVIRONMENTA4
RESEARCH I
COUNCIL I
\
UNIVER-,'
SITIES
OPERATORSI
CONTRAChTRSI •
. \ POLLUTION II
CONTROL
MANUI-
OIL I FACTURERS'
COMPANIES
\'
EECI
CONSERVATIONISTS,i
ECOLOGISTS i
EXPLORATION AND ...11---4
PRODUCTION FORUMI
EPA,
PARIS
COMMISSION
UK-NORWAY
BILATERAL
.. ".
IMeO: Intergovernmental M.itime Consultative Organization\1
Figure 5.\ Potential actor configuration in setting standards for offshore chronic oil -I
discharges in the UK.
.-
NORWEGIAN
OFFSHORE
1--...... OPE RATORS
COMMITTEE
.... ~ ~
I
STATE POLLUTION',
I CONTROL AUTHORITY)(SPCA) /. - .
REGULATOR I~ PETRO.LEU.M r~DIRECTORATEMARITIMEIDIRECTORATE!FISHERY I
DIRECTORATEI
RESEARCH I
INSTITUTES I
SAME AS UKI
. EXPLORATION AND ____
PRODUCTION FORUM
•
SAME AS UK\
IMCO!
UK-NORWAV!
BILATERAL I
Figure 6_1 Potential actors configuration in setting standards for offshore chronic oil
discharges in Norway.
-28-
. ;
NONE/ GRAVITY" GAS FLOTATIONI 'REINJECTION I
SEPARATION AND CHEMICALS! OF OILY WATER,
/~
SIMPLE I CONTINUOUS I
GRAVITY SEPARATION GRAVITY SEPARATION
~, /.,
PARALLel I CORRUGATEDI
PLATE PLATE
INTERCEPTO~RC\~
ON LY 01 L / ON LY \ BOTH J
ATR\~~"'~T
NONE I INFRA-I ULTRA-/ GRAV'IMETRIC I GAS I
RED VIOLET . CHROMATOGRAPHY:I
[
o
u..!
Oa:
wOw
ut-u
oi>
::I:OW
u:!!Q
6
o I 1 I HOUR RESIDENT TIMEI PRIMARY i
BIOLOGICAL I
DEGRADATION I
.. ,
---/-\~- - - - ------ SECO~DARY!
NONE I GAS I CHEMICAL I FILTERING I
FLOTATION PROCESSING
, \
I \
--'---' -
A~:---~
• BURY I BURN I DISCHARGEI PRoCESS I
, INTO SEA
, ,
i
I
."
Figure 7.'1 Some branches of a developer's tree of oily water treatment altematives. /'
I IV I.D ,
M
IN
IM
IZ
E
O
IL
Y
SH
OR
E
W
AT
ER
S
A
N
D
BE
AC
HE
S·
RE
ST
RI
CT
IN
TE
R
FE
R
EN
CE
W
IT
H
M
AN
'S
N
O
R
M
AL
US
E
OF
TH
E
EN
VI
R
O
NM
EN
T
M
IN
IM
IZ
E
TA
IN
TI
N
G
AN
D
CH
RO
NI
C
TO
XI
CI
TY
OF
CO
M
M
ER
CI
AL
SP
EC
IE
S
PR
OT
EC
T
H
UM
AN
H
EA
LT
H
AN
D
SA
FE
TY
PR
OT
EC
T
TH
E
EN
VI
R
O
NM
EN
T
(W
ID
ES
TS
EN
SE
-U
K
D
EF
IN
IT
IO
N)
~
1
~~
--
=o
.-
-
SA
FE
G
UA
RD
PL
AN
T
AN
D
A
N
IM
A
L
LI
FE
VA
LU
AB
LE
TO
M
AN I
M
IN
IM
IZ
E
M
O
R
TA
LI
TY
OF
7
E
MA\
NE
ORG
ANIS
MS
M
IN
IM
IZ
E
-
-
M
IN
IM
IZ
E
M
O
R
TA
LI
TY
M
O
R
TA
LI
TY
OF
OF
RA
RE
CO
M
M
ER
CI
AL
SP
EC
IE
S
SP
EC
IE
S
M
IN
IM
IZ
E
EC
O
LO
G
IC
AL
DI
ST
UR
BA
NC
ES
M
IN
IM
IZ
E
PE
R
M
AN
EN
T
AD
VE
RS
E
EF
FE
CT
S
ON
TH
E
N
AT
U
R
AL
EN
VI
R
O
NM
EN
T
•
o
n
ly
if
o
il
po
llu
tio
n
is
m
as
siv
e
a
n
d
cl
os
et
o
th
e
sh
or
e
I'
Fi
gu
re
8.
G
oa
lt
re
e
fo
ri
rn
pa
ct
ee
sc
o
n
ce
rn
ed
a
bo
ut
ch
ro
ni
c
o
il
po
llu
tio
n.
-30-
standard setting in the United Kingdom was actually done
in two steps. First guideline standards (40 to 50 ppm) were
elaborated by the Central Unit on Environmental Pollution (see
CUEP, 1976). Because of a lack of biological information (see
National Academy of Sciences, 1975; National Research Council,
1974) these guideline standards were set largely on the basis
of treatment availability, cost, and performance considera-
tions. Extreme regulatory solutions (for example zero discharge)
were never seriously considered, as extreme treatment solutions
(reinjection of oily water into an empty reservoir, or biologi-
cal treatment) were considered infeasible or too costly. The
Petroleum Production Division of the Department of Energy handles
the day-to-day operations of setting and enforcing standards.
In Norway there were no guideline standards, but standards
were set on a case by case basis. Starting from the middle
of 1978, however, the guideline standard will be between 25
and 30 ppm. These numbers have to be interpreted with much
care, however, since it turns out that the specific definitions
of sampling period, sample sizes, and the number of exemptions
from standards play an important role in the implication of
the actual numerical value of a standard (see v. Winterfeldt,
1978, TR-8).
The policy analysis allowed us to draw certain comparisons
and suggested recommendations for further improvement of standard
setting. Similarities between the United Kingdom and Norway
include for example:
The emphasis is on treatment equipment;
Standards are set on a case by case basis;
There are attempts to work with industry in the
design stage;
Monitoring is tied to discharge permits;
Responsibility to monitor rest with the company;
Standards are set in the vicinity of 40 ppm;
Energy unit inspects platforms.
The main differneces between the two countries are summarized
in Table 1.
The recommendations included:
improvement of inhouse (governmental) expertise
on oil treatment equipment to remove dependence
on industry assessments;
improvement of research on effects of low-concentra-
tion oily water around production platforms;
Table 1
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COMPARISON OF REGULATORS OF OIL DISCHARGES CONNECTED
WITH OFFSHORE PLATFOID1S IN THE NORTH SEA
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NORWAY AND UK
I
i
I
NORWAY
• regulator is pollution
control authority with
emphasis on environment
• regulator had to create
regulatory structure
• impactees asked for comments
• regulator open with
information
• problem viewed as
environmental with emphasis
on fish impacts
• no research on treatment
alternatives
• pessimistic estimates of
total amount of oil
discharges
UK
• regulator is petroleum
production unit with
emphasis on energy
• regulator had to redesign
regulatory structure
• impactees not asked for
comments
• regulator keeps information
confidential
• problem viewed as political
and technical
• published one paper on
treatment alternatives
• optimistic estimates of
total amount of oil
discharges
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improvement of the process of circulation and infor-
mation gathering for discharge applications (to
include impactees, and to provide a more useful
response format).
The Shinkansen Noise Standards Study
The noise standards study was a part of a larger study by
IIASA's Management and Technology Area on the management of
the superrapid Shinkansen trains in Japan. As it turns out,
noise pollution is one of the most severe environmental impacts
of the Shinkansen. The information used for the standard
setting study on noise pollution was based on a conference
held at IIASA, where Japanese representatives participated and
part of which dealt with the noise issue. In-depth interviews
were held in Japan during a IIASA field study, mainly with
representatives of the Environment Agency, the Japanese National
Railway Corporation, and a lawyer's association representing
residents who suffer from noise pollution.
The problem of noise pollution is one of the most severe
pollution problems in Japan. Over 24,000 complaints reached
the Japanese Environment Agency on noise issues in 1975 alone.
Complaints over trains are a relatively small fraction, but
there exists a strong and organized opposition against Shinkansen
noise. When the IIASA study team became involved in the noise
pollution problem, standards for Shinkansen trains had already
been set. The bulk of the study was therefore restricted to
a retrospective analysis of how the Environment Agency had
set noise standards. However, one part of the analysis dealt
with the ongoing law suit of residents against the Japanese
National Railway (JNR) -to reduce noise pollution.
The main actors in the noise standard setting were the
Environment Agency with its advisory body, the Council for Pollu-
tion Control as the regulator, the JNR as the developer, and the
residents along the line as the impactees. A particular
impactee group, the "Nagoya Association Against Shinkansen
Public Nuisance" was identified as a prototypical organization
of impacted residents. A broader actor spectrum is represented
in Figure 9.
Figures 10 and 11 present the goal tree and the alternative
tree for the JNR as examples of the analysis. The possible
regulatory actions of the Environment Agency were already
outlined on page 6. Actions of the impacted residents could
include:
complaints by individuals;
petitions by groups to prefectures, the JNR, or
the Environment Agency;
organization of residents;
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MINIMIZE
<
INVESTMENT
COST COST
MINIMIZE
OPERATION
COST
MAXIMIZE TRAIN SPEED
/ (MINIMIZE SPEED REDUC-TIONS FOR NOISE CONTROL)SERVICE MAXIMIZE PASSENGER COM-~ FORT (MINIMIZE VISIBILITYINTERFERENCE THROUGH E.G.SOUND BARRIERS)~l MAXIMIZE SAFETY AND RE LIA-BILITY OF TRAIN OPERATIONS
.....-
~ MINIMIZE PENALTIES DUE TO
REGULATION VIOLATION
COMPLIANCE
WITH ~l M,NIMIZE COMPENSATION COSTREGULATION
MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONSHIP
WITH REGULATOR
FUTURE MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY FOR
DEVELOPMENT FUTURE SHINKANSEN DEVELOPMENT
OPTIONS DEVELOPMENT
Figure 10. Potential objectives of JNR in decision making for noise pollution control.
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legal litigation;
extralegal actions.
In fact all these steps have been followed by the Nagoya
Association except for the last.
The Environment Agency had the alternative of setting
either environmental quality standards (targets, desirable
states to be reached some time in the future) or enforcement
standards (tools for forcing the JNR to begin noise protection
measures). One of the main findings of the study was that the
Environment Agency intended to set environmental quality
standards, but in effect set standards which turned out to be
enforcement standards with precise guidelines and deadlines
for the JNR to comply (see Table 2). However, these standards
were set almost exclusively on the basis of noise-complaint
relationships which were established through research of the
Environment Agency and independent research institutes. The
standards were set such that approximately 30 percent of the
people subjected to the standard level of noise would tend to
complain. No other technical information (for example on noise-
speed relationships, on the availability and performance of
noise abatement technology) were explicitly considered. Neither
had the costs of such noise abatement technology been taken
into account.
This is a reversed picture of the chronic oil case where
standards were set mainly on cost and performance considera-
tions (within political constraints), neglecting environmental
considerations because of a lack of data. In the noise case,
cost and performance were neglected and noise standards were
set mainly on environmental considerations. This would have
been appropriate for environmental quality standards. However,
for enforcement standard considerations of a technical nature,
cost and performance should have been taken into account.
Therefore, one of the conclusions of the study was that the
Environment Agency of Japan did not use a sufficient data
base for justifying the (enforcement) standards.
Other findings of this study include:
Only limited alternatives for noise regulation
were considered (no consideration of slowing
down the trains in certain areas, zoning, etc.);
Standards were set on an arbitrary complaint level;
The JNR was only reactive in the process of standard
setting;
The JNR views the noise problem as purely technical;
Slowdown effects on noise reduction were played
down by the JNR.
Table 2
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ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STANDARDS FOR SHINKANSEN
(BULLET TRAIN) NOISE
Ministerial Order issued by Environment Agency on 29 July 1975,
based on Article 9, Basic Law for Environmental Pollution
Control ~easures.
CATEGORY OF AREA REGULATION LEVEL
Class I 70 dB(A) or less
Class II 75 dB(A) or less
TARGET FULFILMENT PERIOD
ZONAL CATEGORY
A Areas with 80
db (A) or over
B Areas with 75-
79 dB(A)
C Areas with 70-
74 dB(A)
AREAS ALONG
EXISTING
SHINKANSEN LINES
in 3 years
(a) in 7 years
(b) in 10 years
in 10 years
AREAS ALONG
LINES UNDER
CONSTRUCTION
on start of
service
in 3 years
after start
of service
in 5 years
after start
of service
AREAS ALONG
NEWLY BUILT'
LINES
on start of
service
on start of
service
on start of
service
Note: In any area, where it is failed to achieve the standards
within above specified periods, in spite of best effort,
performance should be completed as early as possible.
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Having uncovered some shortcomings and problems in two
real world standard setting cases, one asks the next question of
possible methodological improvements in standard setting noise.
For this purpose, decision and game theoretic models were
developed which will be described in the following section.
DECISION AND GAME THEORETIC MODELS FOR STANDARD SETTING
Purpose and Structure of the Models
Decision and game theoretic models can be useful methodo-
logical tools for studying decision making of multiple groups
under uncertainty and possible multiple conflicting objectives.
The possibility of using such models for standard setting had
been recognized by several researchers (see, for example,
National Academy of Sciences, 1975). Therefore, the develop-
ment and application of such models was one of the major
tasks of the standard setting research at IIASA.
The purpose of the decision theoretic model was to pro-
vide a framework, structure, and a formal language along which
a regulatory agency can organize its information processing
and evaluation tasks when setting standards. The usual single
decision maker model (see Raiffa, 1968; Howard, 1968) was
adapted for these purposes by extending it to a three decision
makers model which encompasses the decision making of a regu-
lator, a developer (producer), and an impactee. The model is
a one-stage hierarchical optimization model in which optimal
responses of the developer to regulation and of the impactee
to development actions can be determined. It was soon recog-
nized for some applications that this model was too simple
and needed more feedback loops and an extension into a dynamic
process. Such an extension was then elaborated in a three-
decision maker dynamic game model by which future actions could
be simulated in standards setting and certain "optimal" solu-
tions (for example equilibrium points or Pareto optimal solu-
tions) can be determined.
Before going into the detailed discussion of the models,
one has to point out the main similarities and differences
between these models. The decision model is a static detailed
model of trade-offs, information processing, and decision
making of the three decision making units (regulator, developer,
and impactee). Through the use of probabilistic submodules
for the detection of regulation violation and for environmental
impacts it allows a finely graded analysis of the regulation
problem. In turn it gives up the dynamics and multiple inter-
actions between the decision making groups over time.
The dynamic game model makes such extension possible but
only at certain costs. Although it has the same structure
(three decision makers, a hierarchical solution concept as one
possibility), it operates on a much more aggregated level. It
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does not explicitly construct utility functions or probabili-
ties of detection, but incorporates these aspects in an aggre-
gated way in the transition probabilities between the stages
of the game and in aggregate utility functions defined on the
actions of the three decision makers. Although the game
theoretic model does not allow a detailed analysis of trade-
offs and probabilities, it can be very useful for parametric
analysis of the crucial points in a dynamic standard setting
process.
The Decision Theoretic Model
A detailed description of the model can be found in
v. Winterfeldt (1978, TR-8,9). The rough structure of the
model is shown in Figure 12. The model considers three deci-
sion making units, generically called the regulator, developer,
and the impactee. For each decision unit a normative model
(for more details on building decision models, see Raiffa,
1968; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Howard, 1968; Edwards,
Lindman, and Phillips, 1965) is constructed which operation-
alizes qualitative objectives as numerical consequence measures,
and specifies probability distributions over these consequence
measures. These probability distributions depend on the action
taken and on external actions or events (for example, detection
of a violation of a regulation and the information available).
Finally, an evaluation model is built by which trade-offs and
possible risk attitudes of the decision maker are taken into
account, and which allows to numerically evaluate alternative
action.
If a regulator decides on a particular standard, here
labeled r, the developer's decision making will be influenced
by the possibility of detection of regulation violations and
the resulting sanctions. Through the decision model an optimal
response d(r) by the developer is determined, which may not
be the decision he would have taken without regulation. Through
pollution generating events and effects the environment and its
users (impactees) are affected. Impactees may decide to leave
polluted areas or to take legal action against the polluter.
Again through the decision theoretic model an optimal response
by the impactee a(d) can be determined. Thus the model can
determine optimal responses d(r) and a[d(r)] as a function
of r together with the associated numerical evaluations of
these actions (utilities) UR, UD' UA•
In order to make such a hierarchical optimization possible,
several crucial independence assumptions had to be made:
the consequences for the regulator depend only
on his own action;
the consequences for the developer depend only
on the regulator's action and his own;
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REGULATORY
.-----1 DECISION
MODEL
DETECTION OF
REGULATION
VIOLATION
DEVELOPER
DECISION
MODEL
SANCTIONS
POLLUTION
GENERATING
EVENTS
IMPACTEE
DECISION
MODEL
POLLUTION EFFECTS
UD(a[d(r)] )
Figure 12. Schematic representation of the regulator-developer-impactee model.
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the consequences for the impactee depend only on
the developer's action and his own.
The decision models for the three decision units are a
combination of a hierarchical inference model (see Kelly and
Barclay, 1973) and a multiattribute utility model (see
v. Neumann and Morgenstern, 1948; Savage, 1954; Fishburn,
1970). The models have been adapted to standard setting such
that all parameters can in principle be assessed through
expert interrogation without a very difficult formal elicita-
tion process.
In addition to these basic models two submodules labeled
"Detection and Sanctions" and "Pollution Generating Events
and Effects" were created which link the three decision units.
The detection and sanction submodule for normal operating losses
is built on performance distributions of the equipment which
reflect the uncertainty about day-to-day performance, the
uncertainty about the parameters of the equipment, and the uncer-
tainty built in the monitoring and inspection procedures of
the regulator. The pollution generating events and effects
submodule is basically an event tree exemplified in Figure 13.
The tree starts with operating conditions following the develop-
er's decision on equipment. It then goes through random
emission levels, and over ambient levels to ultimate pollu-
tion effects. At each stage conditional probability distri-
butions are assessed on the basis of expert judgments or models.
The model has been constructed in this extensive form for
both emission and safety standards. More limited applica-
tions have been done for emission standards. The possible uses
of the models are:
to structure the regulation problem;
to enable regulators and experts to express uncer-
tainties and intangibles quantitatively;
to identify a set of good standard solutions;
to allow a study of the sensitivities of the regu-
latory solution to conflicting values, opinions,
and information.
The Multistage Game Theoretic Model
A great part of the pollution regulation problem can be
adequately treated by the previous one-stage model including
special long-term problems where the time points of necessary
adaptation are far apart. Among these, however, are problems
where either the physical or the economic conditions are changed
substantially by the measures of the groups involved, or where
later measures depend on previous measures. Furthermore, it
FI REI EXPLOSIONS/
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,NORMAL I
.OPERATION (NO)
EMISSION LEVELS)
GIVEN NO
CONDITIONAL I
"-~---+-PROBABI L1TY I
DISTRIBUTIONS I
AMBIENT LEVELS I
GIVEN EMISSION
EFFECTS GIVEN I
AMBIENT LEVELS
Figure 13. \ Segment of an event tree for pollution generating effects and events./
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was our aim to include the conflict situation between the groups
involved. Hence for an extension of the model we primarily have
to choose among simulation, gaming, and game theory.
Simulation could be applied if we had a complete model of
the consequences of actions and if we prescribed the behavior
or the strategies of the groups. Then the consequences are
determined usually by programming. There are two reasons why
this approach is difficult to deal with. First, it takes a
large computational effort to obtain an appropriate standard
setting procedure. Second, the behavior of the groups involved
would be completely hypothetical. The last problem could be
avoided by gaming where players choose actions. The players
can be experimental subjects and observers such that the
development of the basic real life problem could be predicted
and perhaps an "optimal" standard setting procedure extracted.
The main objection against these approaches is that they consume
substantial time and money.
Contrary to simulation and gaming, game theory yields
goal-oriented decision making processes of all groups involved.
It is based on the assumptions that each individual has a
utility function which he strives to maximize, and that each
individual is able to perceive the game situation. We estab-
lished a dynamic game theoretic framework (see H~pfinger and
Avenhaus, 1978, TR-8) for the conflict situation in environ-
mental decisions. As in the decision theoretic model, three
decision units are considered: the regulator, producer, and
the impactee unit. The regulator may consist of various admin-
istrative units and experts that interact to fix a standard.
This standard generally reduces the gain of the producer repre-
senting, for example, several energy producers emitting pollu-
tants. By means of this standard the impactee representing
the population affected by the pollution has to be protected.
It is hoped that the model is general enough to treat some
essential features of most problems of standard setting.
Furthermore, it should permit parameter analysis such that
crucial uncertainties about health effect and economic devel-
opment can be identified.
The models developed are three person games in extensive
form with a structure shown in Figure 14. Only time periods
or stages are considered instead of a time continuum. Thus a
game is played at each stage and the players' choices control
not only the payoff but also the transition probability govern-
ing the game to be played at the next stage. Since the trans-
ition probabilities are often not exactly known we admit that
for the players' subjective transition probabilities exist which
may differ from one another. Contrary to the more usual games
where players make simultaneous and independent choices, we
have provided for perfect information for the component game by
introducing the following structure. At each stage, first the
regulator makes his choice, then the producer is informed about
it and makes his choice, and finally the impactee makes his
-44-
STAGE i+1 STATE si+1STAGE i STATE siI I
REGULATOR
"
REGULATOR
~~m~ E MR{Si) ~ c:::> m~1 E MR{si+1)~~
" ~I A...0 ~ I
•
~ ~
•I..;.PRODUCER PRODUCER
m~ E Mp{si ,mR) mi+1 E M (si+1 mi+1)p P , R
I I
• +
IMPACTEE IMPACTEE
ml E M1{si,mR,mp) ml+1 E MI{si+1,m~1 ,m~+1)
MR{si): Set of regulator's choices at stage i
Mp{si,mR): Set of producer's choices at stage i , given m~ E MR
MI{si ,mR,mp): Set of impactee's choices at stage j , given m~ E MR
and m~ E Mp.
Figure 14. Structure of the dynamic game theoretic model.
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decision, knowing the regulator's and the producer's choices.
The utilities are assumed to be the discounted sums of the
payoffs of the utilities of the component games. In order to
keep the computational burden within limits, only stationary
strategies have been admitted. No unique game theoretic solu-
tion was worked out, but several possible solutions were
considered in the applications.
The range of applications has been indicated by the cases
of North Sea oil, sulphur dioxide, carbon dioxide, and noise
(see Hdpfinger and Avenhaus, 1978, TR-8)-. Only the cases of
carbon dioxide and noise could be treated as multistage games
due to shortage of time. In the first case, essentially all
solution concepts were used.
A final judgment of the value of this game theoretic
framework for dynamic standard setting procedures would require
the treatment of a variety of problems. But some conclusions
can already be drawn. First, the game theoretic model allows
the derivation of "optimal" standard setting procedures where
optimal relates to a special solution concept. Which solution
concept is to be used dep~nds on whether the regulator wants
~o exert his power of announcement or whether he agrees to
"fair" comparison of utilities, which in the case of carbon
dioxide results in strategies based on the most cautious esti-
mate of the critical level, otherwise the regulator's estimate
dominates. Furthermore, the critical parameters can be identi-
fied. As demonstrated for the noise case, juridical procedures
can be formalized within this framework at least in such a way
that a court sentence is represented by a transition from one
state to another. Since the representation of the population
as a rational player is not self-evident, one could alternative-
ly want to represent it as a response function based on the
population's perception of pollution and perhaps of the regu-
lator's choices. Indeed, the impactee's strategy relating to
a solution can be taken as such a response function.
Although in some cases, for example, if multilateral
problems are treated, extensions of the model can be appropriate,
it seems that there are basic features of the pollution problem,
the structuring of which would specialize the framework much
more and thus render it much more powerful. For example,
one could specify the monitoring and surveillance aspect to
determine whether the producer operates within the standard.
MODEL APPLICATIONS
Application of the Decision Model to Chronic Oil Discharge
Standards
The decision theoretic model summarized in the section,
"Purpose and Structure of Models" and developed in detail in
v. Winterfeldt (1978, TR-9) was applied to the problem of chronic
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oil discharge standards in the North Sea. The purpose of this
application was mainly a feasibility test of the model itself.
As it turned out, however, some major lessons could already
be learned from the model, which may have impacts on the
decision making of the regulatory agencies in Norway and the
United Kingdom.· The model reflects the real standard setting
situation in the United ~ingdom. rhe decision unit which the
model was to relate to for decision aiding purposes was the
Petroleum Production Division in the Department of Energy
which has the regulation responsibility for chronic oil
discharges.
Table 3 presents the major model inputs from the policy
analysis described in the section, "The Chronic Oil Discharge
Study".
The regulatory alternatives were first formalized by
the set of possible standard levels of oil concentration in
the effluent, labeled SL:
Standard sanctions were thought to have the following form:
o if no detection occurs:
SS =
KO + C(d j +1 ) - C(d j ) if detection occurs;
where KO is a fixed penalty, C(d j ) is the cost of treatment j,
and C(d j +1 ) is the cost of the next best treatment. The total
penalty was then defined as a fixed amount plus the cost of
improving treatment from d j to d j + 1 , which was assumed to be
just the difference in cost between the two treatments. The
following monitoring, inspection, and sampling definitions SM
were analyzed:
The United Kingdom's definition of a maximum standard
(UK-I~X)
Two samples are taken on every day. During anyone month not
more than two samples (no averaging) may exceed the standard sl.
EPA's definition of an average standard (EPA-AV)
The daily average of four samples may not exceed the standard
sl more often than twice during anyone month.
D
EC
IS
IO
N
U
N
IT
T
ab
le
3
A
LT
ER
N
A
TI
V
ES
QU
AL
IT
AT
IV
E
M
OD
EL
IN
PU
TS
O
B
JE
C
TI
V
ES
EX
TE
RN
A
L
EV
EN
TS
:::d I:I:I ~
P
et
ro
le
u
m
t"i
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
~
D
iv
is
io
n
,
UK
o :::d
1
.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
L
ev
el
2.
S
an
ct
io
n
s
3.
Sa
m
pl
e
s
iz
e
,
e
x
e
m
p
ti
o
n
s,
in
sp
ec
ti
o
n
p
ro
ce
du
re
1
.
A
gr
ee
w
it
h
s
ta
n
d
ar
d
s
o
f
o
th
er
n
a
ti
o
n
s
2.
S
a
ti
sf
y
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
de
m
an
ds
fo
r
a
c
le
an
N
o
rt
h
S
ea
INo
ne
c
o
n
s
id
er
ed
3.
A
gr
ee
w
it
h
n
a
ti
o
n
al
e
n
e
r
g
y
p
o
li
cy
4.
A
gr
ee
w
it
h
n
a
ti
o
n
al
e
n
v
i-
ro
n
m
e
n
t
p
o
li
cy
4
.
5
.
6
.1
.
2
.
3
•
o I:I:I <: I:I:I t"i o "'0 I:I:I :::d
O
ff
sh
o
re
O
il
O
p
er
at
o
rs
N
o
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t
S
im
pl
e
G
ra
v
it
y
T
an
k
C
o
rr
u
g
at
ed
P
la
te
In
te
r-
c
e
p
to
r
(C
PI
)
C
PI
a
n
d
G
as
F
lo
ta
ti
o
n
C
P
I,
G
F,
a
n
d
F
il
te
rs
C
P
I,
G
F,
F
,
a
n
d
B
io
lo
g
ic
al
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t
7.
R
ei
n
je
ct
io
n
o
f
o
il
y
w
a
te
r
in
to
e
m
pt
y
r
e
s
e
r
v
o
ir
1
.
2
•
3
•
M
in
im
is
e
in
v
es
tm
en
t
c
o
s
t
fo
r
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t
M
in
im
is
e
o
p
er
at
io
n
c
o
s
t
fo
r
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t
M
in
im
is
e
p
e
n
a
lt
ie
s
du
e
to
r
e
g
u
la
ti
o
n
v
io
la
ti
o
n
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
v
s
.
N
o
n
-d
et
ec
ti
o
n
o
f
s
ta
n
d
ar
d
s
v
io
la
ti
o
n
I += -...J I
H ~I.
h
n
F1
S
e
rm
e
n
~
E
co
lo
g
is
ts
I:I:I
P
u
b
li
c
N
o
a
c
ti
o
n
s
c
o
n
s
id
er
ed
,
v
ie
w
ed
a
s
"
s
u
ff
er
er
s"
1
.
2
.
3.
M
in
im
is
e
m
o
r
ta
li
ty
o
f
c
o
m
-
m
e
r
c
ia
l
m
a
r
in
e
o
r
ga
ni
sm
s
M
in
im
is
e
ta
in
ti
n
g
a
n
d
c
h
ro
n
ic
to
x
ic
it
y
o
f
fi
sh
a
n
d
o
th
er
m
a
r
in
e
o
r
ga
ni
sm
s
M
in
im
is
e
e
c
o
lo
g
ic
al
d
is
tu
rb
an
ce
s
R
an
do
m
P
o
ll
u
ti
o
n
L
ev
el
s
UR(Sl) = w ·100 0eR1
-48-
The Norwegian definition of an average standard (NWY-AV)
The daily average of continuous monitoring may not exceed the
standard sl more often than once during anyone month.
United Kingdom's definition of an average standard (UK-AV)
The monthly average of two daily samples may not exceed the stan-
dard sl more often than once quring the lifetime of the plant.
A standard r is therefore described as the triple (sl, sm,
ss). The utility function UR was defined as an aggregate of
four utility functions v Ri which expressed the degree to which
the four regulatory objectives in Table 6 are met as a function
of sl. The aggregate is a simple weighted additive function of
the form: .
(sl-30)2
144 + w
R2
- 100 0e -.0140s1 +
2
+ (100 100 -.014os1) + w 01000e - (sl-40)
wR3 ° - e R4 577
Figure
UR(sl)
scheme
scheme
among
15 shows the shape of the regulator's utility function
for two different weighting schemes: a unit weighting
in which all wRi = .25, and a differential weighting
which seems to reflect the United Kingdom's priorities
the three objectives.
The developer's alternatives are listed in Table 4 together
with approximate investment and operations cost. Total costs
were calculated on the basis of a 15 year lifetime of the
production platform and undiscounted operations costs. The
alternatives d. are ranked in increasing order of cost and
J
effectiveness. The developer's decision depends crucially on
whether his treatment may lead to a detection of a violation or
not. Table 5 presents the developer's decision problem in the
form of a payoff matrix. In case of no detection the developer
just pays the cost of treatment. In the case of detection he
pays the cost of treatment, plus a penalty KO' plus an incre-
mental cost to improve treatment to the next best level, which
just adds to the cost of the next best treatment.
The probability of detection (labeled Q1) depends on the
choice of treatment d., the standard level sl, and the defini-
J
tion of the inspection and monitoring procedure sm (UK-~~,
EPA-AV, UK-AV, NWY-AV). The utility function of the developer
----------- --------
-- UNIT WEIG~!IN~ SCHEME (.25, .25, .25, .25)
DIFFERENTIAL WEIGHTING SCHEME
(.10, .20, .40, .30)
100
90
> 80~
...J
~ 70
~
~ 60
c::
0 50~
ex:
...J 40~
~
30w
c::
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10
0
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32 36
50 60 70
STANDARD LEVEL
80
sl
Figure 15. Overall value function of the regulator for two weighting schemes.
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Table 4
ILLUSTRATIVE COST ESTIMATES FOR DEVELOPER'S TREATMENT OPTIONS
(10 3 Pound Sterling); 1978
Operation/
CD1
Installation Totalyear (no disc.)
d 1 (no treatmen t) 0 0 0
d 2 (gravity tank) 0 3 45
d 3 (corr. plate int.) 70* " 5 345
d 4 (CPI + Gas Flotation) 140** 10** 290
d 5 (CPI + GF + Filtering) 200 15 425
d 6 (CPI + GF + F + Bio) 500 50 1250
d 7 (reinjection) 2100*** 115*** 3825
* Source: CUEP[9]
** Source: Manufacturer's data
***Source: NAS[lO]
All other data are rough estimates.
Table 5
PAYOFF ~fATRIX FOR THE DEVELOPER
(entries in 10 3 Pounds)
DETECTION STATES
NO DETECTION (QO) DETECTION (01 )
d 1 0 45 + KO
d 2 45 145 + KO
d 3 145 290 + KO
d 4 290 425 + KO
d 5 425 1250 + KO
d 6 1250 3825 + KO
d 7 3825 -*
* No detection is possible for d 7 ·
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is defined as the negative expected cost:
where po(Qp) and PO(Q1) are the probabilities of detection and
non-detection, respectively. The objective of the developer
is to maximize Uo(dj,r) with respect to j = 1,2, ... 7, given
r = (sl, sm, ss).
Probabilities of detection versus non-detection were
modeled using treatment performance estimates, rough estimates
of the probability distributions over the average treatment
performance, and the respective monitoring and inspection
procedures defined above. All distributions involved were
assumed to be normal. Given costs and probabilities, optimal
decisions of the developer could be determined together with
their associated expected costs. Figure 16 gives a typical
result of this analysis. It shows that the developer selects
constant treatment decisions within certain ranges of the
possible standard value. The cutoff points are those at which
the cost of the next best treatment is just equal to the
expected cost of detection.
Table 6 demonstrates the most important result of the
analysis: the sensitivity of the cutoff points to different
monitoring and inspection definitions. As can clearly be seen,
the cutoff points at which the developer would change from d.
J
to d. 1 depend critically on the definition of detection. The
J+
UK-~~X definition forces the developer to respond most conserva-
tively to a given standard, while the UK-AV definition leaves
him the greatest freedom. For example, for the UK-AV definition,
the developer would switch from CPI to gas flotation only if the
standard is lower than 62 ppm. For the UK-MAX definition, this
switch would already occur at 78 ppm. One would expect KO to
also have a strong influence on the cutoff level. However, vary-
ing KO between 10,000, 100,000, and 1,000,000 Pounds did not
have nearly the effect as varying the monitoring and inspection
procedure. Also, using nonlinear utility functions for money
did not have a $ubstantial impact on the cutoff points.
The impactee model is very simple. The random emission
level is assumed to be a proxy measure for the degree to which
the impactees objectives are met. The value function is
defined simply as the negative emission level. Since the im-
pactees themselves have no action alternatives, the expected
value can be calculated from the performance characteristics
of the equipments as follows:
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Table 6
CUTOFF LEVELS lO(d j ) AT WHICH THE DEVELOPER WOULD SWITCH
FROM TREATMENT d j TO TREATMENT d j +1 (FOR KO = 100 000)
MONITORING AND INSPECTION PROCEDURE
UK-MAX EPA-AV NWY-AV UK-AV
d 1 (none) 872 767 785 754
d 2 (gravity) 172 151 155 147
d 3 (CPI) 78 66 64 62
d 4 (CPI, GF) 38 34 34 32
d 5 (CPI,GF,F) 13. 7 10.4 1O. 1 9. 1
d 6 (CPI,GF,F,B) 2. 1 1.6 1 .5 1 . 4
d 7 (reinject) - - - -
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Table 7 is an example of the final results of the analysis.
For the purpose of constructing this table the utility functions
of the three·decision making units were standardized to cover
similar ranges. The most interesting result is that there are
several dominated standards, i.e., standards that are not better
than others for any decision maker and worse for at least one.
For example, the 50 ppm standard leads to utilities of 48 for
the regulator, 28 for the developer, and 80 for the impactees.
However, the 40 ppm standard results in the same decision of
the developer, and thus the same utilities for the developer and
impactees, while the regulator's utility increases to 62. In
this case the 50 ppm standard would be considered dominated by
that of 40 ppm. The model would suggest to eliminate it from
further consideration.
The reason for this dominance effect lies in the fact that
the developer responds to a continuous decision of the regulator
by a discrete response, and that the impactees' utilities depend
only on this discrete response. Within most of the range between
two cutoff points (see Figure 13) the utility of the developer
does not change* and begins to decrease only when the next
cutoff point is approached.
The most important results of this illustrative model run
can be summarized as follows:
As long as the developer's response to standards
is discrete and the impactees are considered
sufferers, there will be many dominated standards,
where dominance is dictated largely by the regu-
lator's utility function.
The nondominated standards tend to cluster around
cutoff points at which the expected cost of treat-
ment plus penalty is just equal to the expected
cost of the next treatment. Thus the regulator's
attention should be on the location of such cutoff
points.
The location of these cutoff points is controlled
largely by the uncertainty about equipment perfor-
mance, and the definition of the monitoring and
inspection procedures (sample size, exemptions
from detection, etc.).
Penalty variations and nonlinear utility function
do not have a strong effect on cutoff points.
*Strictly speaking this is not true, since there are~ of course,
small changes in the utility fiunction e~en at values slightly
below a'cutoff point. However, for all practical purposes
these decreases can be neglected. The actual dominance.anal-
ysis neglected decreases of less than 100 pound sterling.
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Table 7
UTILITIES OF REGULATOR, DEVELOPER, AND IMPACTEES
AS A FUNCTION OF THE STANDARD sl
(KO = 100 000, EPA-AV scheme, unit weights wRi )
sl d j (sl) UR (s1) UD[d j (sl)] UA(d j )
0 d 7 26 -856 100
1 d 7 26.5 -856 100
2 d 6 27 -213 99
5 d 6 29 -213 99
10 d 6 30 -213 99
15 d 5 38 - 6 95
20 d 5 48 - 6 95
35 d 4 65 28 80
40 d 4 62 28 80
50 d 4 48 28 80
100 d 3 28 64 50
150 d 3 26 64 50
500 d 2 25 89 0
1000 d 1 25 100 -400
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Because of the influence of the monitoring and
inspection procedure a standard is not equal to
a standard. Standards with the same numerical
value but with different monitoring and inspec-
tion procedures will be either stricter or less
strict. For example, everything else being equal,
a standard based on an average of four samples
will be stricter than a standard based on an
average of 100 samples or on continuous monitor-
ing.
Based on this illustrative model analysis it is not possible
to make a firm recommendation about standards. In particular,
no attempt has been made to tackle the important question of
modeling the ecological consequences of chronic oil pollution.
Also, the regulator model is still rather crude. However, the
model did demonstrate the importance of equipment uncertainty
on the developer's decision making, thus confirming the qual-
itative concern the oil industry has about such uncertainties.
Since standards are inherently statistical definitions, it may
be important to pursue more a refined statistical analysis of
the consequences of standard setting decisions.
Application of the Game Theoretic Model to Noise and CO2Standards
Application to Shinkansen Noise
The problem of Shinkansen noise pollution was described
in the section, "The Shinkansen Noise Standard Study". In this
section we will briefly outline the game theoretic application
to the noise standard setting problem. We consider the following
players from the policy analysis:
regulator: Environment Agency;
developer: Japanese National Railway Corporation;
impactee: residents along the line.
Component states considered are:
maximum quantity of noise near the railway line;
location of population near the line;
layout of soundwalls and other noise protection
measures;
upper bound of train speed.
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The following choices of the three players are considered:
The regulator sets a maximum level of speed or
noise;
The developer builds sound walls, reduces speed,
dislocates or compensates residents;
The impactees file complaints or petitions, organize
themselves, or take legal action.
Consequences or costs and benefits are specified as:
increased or decreased GNP;
dislocation of neighbors;
psychological, or health effects.
The states of the game are a subset of
{ (L,i) I !!~L~n, i=1 ,2, ... 7)}
where L denotes an upper bound for an admitted noise level,
n the maximum level of noise produced by the train operated
under economic conditions, n the minimum value of noise under
which the train can run under economic conditions. (L,1) is
the first state after construction of the railway line. Hence
(L,1) = (n,1). State (L,2) indicates that a petition has
taken place. (L,3) states that the population affected by
noise has built up an organization for negotiations with the
government in order to arrive at a low noise standard. If
negotiations fail, the impactee can start a law suit. This
is indicated by (L,4). (L,4) can be followed by states of
type (L,S), (L,G), or (L,7). (L,S) means that a permanent
compromise is reached with the upper noise bound L. (L,G)
means that the law suit is decided in a neutral or positive
way for JNR and government. (L,7) means that the law suit
is decided in favor of the impactee. (L,S), (L,G), and (L,7)
are the final absorbing states. The relationships between
these states and the transition probabilities are represented
in Figure 17.
Transition probabilities are considered parameters in the
game. They depend on the noise level n I which the impactees
consider acceptable in relation to the actual noise level n,
and the possible standards 1. Utility functions of the regu-
lator and the producer are defined as follows:
,)
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P-P5-P6-P7
iP7
Figure 17. Schematic representation of stages and transition probabilities
in the noise model.
..
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UD: [~,n]+6t
where UR is assumed to be unimodel with a peak at ~~+~, and UD
is assumed to be strictly increasing in the noise level n. Since
reductions of the noise level are costly, this form of the
utility functions of the producsr seems reasonable in many cases
where continuous alternatives for noise pollution abatement
exist. The single-peaked nature of the regulator utility func-
tion was motivated by the assumption that the regulator attempts
to balance conflicting environmental, economic, and political
objectives. The impactee was modeled as a response function,
thus no utility function is considered.
For state i=7, i.e. the state in which impactees win the
law suit (the noise level has to be reduced to n=n r ) , the
regulator's and the producer's utility functions become:
j=R,P
where c.
J
producer
counting
reflects the additional costs the regulator and the
incur as a result of the lost law suit. Given dis-
factors P.~1, j=R,P, solutions for this game can be
J
obtained through dynamic programing. HOpfinger and v. Winter-
feldt (1978, TR-ll) provided some such results for the hier-
archical solution concepts assuming special forms of c., the
J
costs of losing a law suit. Results include that the actions of
the regulator depend crucially on the location of the preferred
noise levels n r and L+ of the regulator and the impactee, re-
spectively. Also the solutions of the game for the regulator
depend heavily on the probability P7 of losing a law suit.
Applications to CO2
The dynamic game theoretic model for CO2 standard setting
is based on the assumption that a continuous increase of CO2
in the atmosphere, caused by fossil fuel burning, will lead to
irreversible and large changes of the climate of the earth if an
unknown critical level of CO2 is exceeded. The regulator is
assumed to be an international agency, and the producer the group
of CO2 emittors. The states of the game are characterized by:
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where
C is the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere;
L is the upper bound of emissions of CO2 during a period;
C is the maximal amount of all fossil fuel burnt;p
k is the critical value for the catastrophe.
k is considered a parameter since its precise value is not
known. Let (C 1 ,L1 ) denote the first state. C1 can be assigned
the present amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide, a~ L1 the
present maximal emission of CO2 . At each of the following
stages, a component game of perfect information is played
which is completely specified by a state. The player's choices
control not only the payoffs, but also the transition probabil-
ities governing the game to be played at the next stage. Each
player has his own subjective estimate of the transition
probability due to his subjective probability of the true
critical value.
The perfect information of the component game is specified
as follows: For state (C,L) the regulator's set of choices is
where t denotes the upper bound (standard) for the emission
of carbon dioxide by the producer. Then the producer chooses
the amount a of carbon dioxide to be emitted. His set of
choices is specified as
M(C,L,t}={alo~~t}
The impactee's set of measures is
where p is an index of the pressure the impactee can exert on
the regulator knowing the choices a and t. p can denote the
probability of a vote against the government or some other
action against governmental institutions.
The set of measures in the case of a catastrophe, i.e. if
the amount of carbon dioxide exceeds k, is defined by zero
standard, no production, and no pressure:
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MR(k) = {a}
Mp(k,o) = {O}
Mr (k, 0 , 0 ) = {O}
A physical transition model links 'the changes in carbon
dioxide amounts in the atmosphere between stages to the actions
of the regulator, the producer, and the impactee. Given state
(C,L) and the choices (~,a,p), the following states are possible:
(C+~a,L) ,
The first component of the first and second states indicates that
a constant share a of emitted carbon dioxide is added to the
amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide. This is consistent with
results of box models for the CO2 cycle of the earth (see
Avenhaus, et al., 1978), if a is emitted during the period at
a constant rate. The estimates for ~ range from between 0.01
and 0.5. The amount (1-~)a is assumed to disappear into the
biosphere, upper mixed layers of the sea, and the deep sea. The
second components express that either the old upper bound remains
or is reduced by a factor of two. rt is assumed that there is
a probability pv that L is replaced by ~, where o~v~1 is a
parameter, provided that the catastrophe will not occur. k~
denotes the amount of carbon dioxide for which the catastrophe
occurs.
All three players are assumed to have subjective probabili-
ties about the critical amount k of carbon dioxide. They
characterize the transition probabilities. To simplify the
model the assumption is made that the subjective probabilities
concentrate at points denoted CR' Cp ' and Cr for the regulator,
producer, and impactee respectively. The model assumes that
CR~P and Cr~p' thus allowing the producer to neglect a
possible catastrophe. By making a series of assumptions about
the form of the transition probabilities and the utility func-
tions of the three players, and by assuming that the total
utility accruing to each player is the undiscounted sum of the
component state utilities, several solutions for the game could
be derived.
The game has a large number of equilibrium points, three of
which are specified as follows:
Let a R, ap ' a r belong to the respective sets of choices
MR, Mp ' Mr· Then the following three solutions are
equilibrium points:
Solution 1:
1
°R(C,L) :
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C -C
= min [L,max (0 ,-j-) ]
1
0I(C,L,.e,a): = 0
Solution 2:
2
°R(c,L):
C -C
= min[L,maX(O,-j--)]
Solution 3:
2
0p(c,L,.e) : = .e C "'C
0 if .e = min (L,-i--) and C~I2 I'
O_(C,L,.e,a) : =
.1 C -C
1 if ~
*
min (L,-}-) or C>CII
3
°R(c,L) = 0
3
0p(c,L,.e) = 0
3 {~ if R. 0 and C=C 1°I(C,L,.e,a) == if R. > 0 or C>c 1
Furthermore, it can be shown that only the first and the second
solutions are Pareto optimal. Figures 18 and 19 illustrate
these results in the regulator-impactee payoff plane. Final
choices of the regulator may thus depend on the relationship
between CI and CR or, respectively, on the relative distance
of the Pareto optimal equilibrium points from the point of
maximal payoff (which itself cannot be achieved). For example,
in Figure 18, the regulator may wish to choose a strategy lead-
ing to equilibrium point 1, in the case of Figure 19 he may
choose equilibrium point 2. These solutions would correspond
to bliss optimal and Nash solutions. The hierarchical solution
(in concept similar to the one of the decision theoretic model)
would in contrast always lead to the first equilibrium point
which is based on the estimate CR as the critical value.
CONCLUSIONS
The intentions of the research on Procedures for the
Establishment of Standards described above were:
to analyze existing procedures for standard setting;
to develop new formal tools to aid regulatory agencies
in standard setting tasks.
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Figure 18. Payoff diagram for regulator and impacter (CR< CI)'
VR
EQUILIBRIUM 1 ci POINT OF MAXIMAL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~PAYOFFSIMPAC!.~E REGION OF POSSIBLE PAYOFFS EQUILIBRIUM 2
UTILITY VI
REGULATOR
UTILITY
Figure 19. Payoff diagram for regulator and impactee (CR > C1).
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Clearly two years of research in a more or less unexplored
field with a mixed multidisciplinary and international team
could not be expected to provide ultimate answers to the most
pressing question of regulatory agencies: What should be done
to improve regulatory standard setting procedures? But although
we cannot yet provide a catalog of principles and procedures
to improve standard setting, our research did identify problem
areas that have priority, it showed the feasibility and limits
of some new formal approaches, and it pointed out where improve-
ment in standard setting is needed and how this could be
achieved through formal analysis.
In this concluding section, we will first discuss what
we consider the most urgent problems of environmental stan-
dard setting. Secondly, we will discuss the feasibility of
analytical approaches such as policy analysis, decision theory,
and game theory to overcome some of these problems. Finally,
we will present some recommendations to regulatory agencies
and researchers in the environmental field for improving stan-
dard setting procedures. Most of these conclusions were
elaborated and consolidated in a review workshop on environ-
mental standard setting held at IIASA in which representatives
from regulatory agencies, industry, and environmental research
institutes discussed the work presented in the previous sections
(see also Appendix 3).
The literature review, the policy analyses, the discussions
with regulators and environmental researchers provided us with
a good understanding of how standard setting is done at the
present time, and where the main problem areas lie. Uncertainty
emerged as the main obstacle to regulatory decision making.
Regulatory agencies and standard setters have to make decisions
based on the information available, and this information is
always limited, often conflicting in terms of data or inter-
pretation, sometimes of relatively poor quality, and seldom
presented in a format suitable for the practical tasks of stan-
dard setting. The piles of background research material usually
collected to backup standard setting decisions, give an idea of
how difficult it is for a regulatory decision maker to aggregate
and evaluate the information pertinent to the decision problem.
Regulators find the problem of evaluating research most
pressing. The questions they continually have to ask them-
selves in guiding, collecting, and evaluating research for a
particular standard setting problem are: Which uncertainties
are we willing to live with when making a decision? Which
information should be collected to reduce unacceptable uncer-
tainties? Who should carry out the work? How should the out-
come of such research be evaluated? Another problem area is
that of summarizing information of expert reports in a format
amenable to the decision problem at hand. Summaries such as
" ... on the basis of available scientific data, no firm conclu-
sions about the potential health effects of pollutant XY ... "
are not uncommon but rarely useful. Rather than drawing
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attention to potential risks and hazards and presenting at
least ranges and best estimates which could enter the standard
setting decision, such vague statements tend to draw the atten-
tion of the regulator to the more tangible (engineering and
cost) considerations of the decision problem, thus changing
the balance of the arguments. Part of this problem of summar-
izing information into a decision relevant format is the prob-
lem of quantifying uncertaintie~ and effects. Although it
has to be acknowledged that not every effect or not every
uncertainty is quantifiable, there appears to be by far too
little quantification in standard setting. Much could be
improved by procedures for expert probability assessment and
relative scaling methods used in decision and measurement
theories. In the area of risk and safety standards, which this
study on~y touched upon, the problem of assessing low prooabi-
lities and weighing them against disastrous consequences poses
many additional problems as the nuclear or carbon dioxide cases
demonstrate. Here the problem arises what to do if information
can not be gathered in an incremental or experimental way.
In such decisions new procedures for collecting and processing
expert judgments have to be developed.
There are many more specific practical problems in the area
of uncertainty in environmental standard setting, some of which
have been discussed earlier:
the problem of conflicting assumptions, data,
and interpretations;
the problems of uncertainties in the chain of
emissions, ambient pollution levels, and ultimate
pollution effects;
the problem of uncertainties about synergistic
effects of pollutants;
the problem of uncertain responses of industry,
impactees, and courts to regulations.
The second important problem area is that of conflicting
objectives~ values~ and intepests of the groups involved and
affected by pollution and regulation. Some of the problems
of conflict mentioned by regulators and environmental researchers
relate to the methodology of coping with conflict situations
and the possible institutional and formal approaches to conflict
resolution, for example:
how to express uncertainties and intangibles in a
form that allows communication between conflicting
decision groups;
how to trade-off cost, performance, and effective-
ness of pollution abatement technology and regula-
tion alternatives;
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how to take into account political objectives
in environmental decision making;
how to achieve equity among the different groups
affected by regulation.
While these problems can to some degree be attacked by formal
tools (for example, cost-benefit analysis, decision theory and
game theory), most regulatorp seem to place the real problem
of conflict into the institutional mechanisms, which are often
badly equipped to solve societal conflicts in standard setting.
The statutory framework, international regulations, and
pressure group actions appear to be major constraints on regu-
latory decision making. Regulators have to rely nearly as
much on their legal staff in drawing up regulations as they
do on scientific experts. This seems to be true at least in
the United States, and probably is for most Western societies.
The courts are considered by some a proving ground for regu-
lation, by others they are perceived as shadow regulators. But
if it is the regulator's task to solve environment-development
conflicts, the additional function of the courts becomes
questionable. Or should it be the court's role to mediate
between environment-development conflicts directly? In this
casa regulatory agencies would be reduced to merely provide
the groundwork for the court's decision. Who, however, is
better equipped to achieve the task of conflict resolution?
Some researchers (for example, National Academy of Sciences,
1975) clearly place the main decision responsibility into the
regulator's hand and ask for a revision of the statutory
framework. Others ask for special courts, for example, science
courts. Still others ask for improved conflict resolution
mechanisms within the regulatory decision making process, for
instance through public participation. In any case, as of now
regulatory representatives regard themselves still far away from
any satisfactory institutional solution to the conflict problem
in regulatory decision making.
The methodological contribution of our research on stan-
dard setting procedures was mainly the development of a policy
analysis approach, and decision and game theoretic models.
Each of these approaches proved valuable in the analysis of the
specific standard setting cases. Each of them also had its
specific limitations. The strength of the policy analysis
approach included:
It takes a broadly oriented view of the standard
setting problem and thus avoids an early restric-
tion to specific solution;
It forces the analyst (and the regulator) to span
a wide range of actors, alternatives, and objectives
for achieving regulatory goals;
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It provides a structure to the environmentai standard
setting problem;
It can point to possible gaps, oversights, and
weaknesses in the information collection and
evaluation task performed by the regulator.
On the other hand, we have to acknowledge certain limits and
weaknesses of the policy analys~s approach:
The analysis provides a purely qualitative pic-
ture of the standard setting problem;
The data base and the evaluation principles are
"soft", and are open to possible biases and mis-
conceptions of the analyst;
It is a methodology for problem identification
rather than for problem solving.
However, if one keeps in mind these weaknesses, the policy
analysis approach may provide a good tool for a pre-analysis
of the standard setting problem. It could be used to review
the status quo of the regulation situation, before the actual
"hard" research part begins. It can help the regulator to
structure the problem in a common language, to identify infor-
mation needs, and to increase his awareness of groups, actions;
and objectives he should consider in standard setting. Although
the applications of the policy analysis approach presented in
this paper were largely concerned with describing ongoing or
past standard setting cases, the methodology easily transfers
to new cases as a starting point for standard setting proce-
dures.
While policy analysis can provide a broad picture of the
standard setting problem, the decision and game theoretic
models developed are meant to aid regulators in finding good
solutions once a specific subproblem for standard setting
is identified. Specific here means that pre-decisions have
been made about regulation alternatives, objectives, and
possibly information sources to be used in the standard setting
task similarly as shown for the chronic oil discharge problem
in the section, "Application of the Decision Model to Chronic
Oil Discharge Standards". The decision theoretic model was
designed to aid regulatory agencies in standard setting tasks by:
structuring the regulation problem;
enabling regulators and experts to quantita-
tively express uncertainties and intangibles;
making trade-offs explicit in form of value and
utility functions;
identifying a set of "good" standard solutions
through a hierarchical optimization algorithm;
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allowing a study of the sensitivity of regulatory
solutions to conflicting values, opinions, and the
degree of information used.
There are many substantive and formal criticisms against such
a modeling approach. The most persuasive is that such a model
is an overformalization of a highly complex and political
process, and that the degree of quantification required by the
model could not be achieved in a real-world standard setting
process. Another substantive criticism is that the model is
silent about the real interactions between the decision makers,
about their institutional embedding, and constraints, and
instead models an idealistic and rational way of thinking about
the standard setting problem which in actual practice has no
chance of being implemented. But even those sympathetic with
the formalization and the decision theoretic approach can find
some major model limitations. The first criticism here is that
the model is static. Although the model is in its probabilis-
tic part a Bayesian model thus allowing updating based on
incoming information, and although it allows considering streams
of outcomes over time, it does not consider an optimal decision
path over time. In addition the model says little about
possible feedbacks between the three decision makers involved
as time elapses. The intentions of the model made such simplica-
tions necessary, at least for a first round of modeling. It is
impossible to model uncertainties and trade-offs in detail and
at the same time consider a highly dynamic and interactive
decision process.
The ultimate evaluation of the decision model must there-
fore be made setting out from its success or failure in appli-
cations. So far there has been only one illustrative applica-
tion to chronic oil discharges. This application has provided
some practical insights into the usefulness and the limits of
the decision modeling, most of which were established in our
discussions with the regulators involved in chronic oil dis-
charges who provided us with valuable feedback about the use
of such models:
In principle the model appears applicable to
relatively routine standard setting cases such
as oil discharges.
The value of modeling political objectives and
evaluations is questionable. The regulator may
prefer to omit this part of the model and use his
own judgment;
The developer model together with the detection
submodule emerged as the heart of the model; the
insights derived from them provided useful inputs
into the regulatory decision making;
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the submodule of pollution generating events and
effects was considered an interesting approach,
but has not yet been effectively applied.
The game theoretic model applications of the noise standards
problem and the global CO2 problem do provide means for extend-ing and elaborating the dynamic and feedback aspects of the
decision theoretic model. In turn it removes itself from the
practical assessment problems a regulator faces (information
and value assessments) which it incorporates in aggregate form
in utility functions and in transition probabilities. Still,
the model applications have shown that through parametric anal-
ysis much is to be learned about the possible solutions of
standard setting problems and the sensitive points regulatory
action may want to approach or avoid. The mathematical abstrac-
tion may make the game theoretic model appear less of a
practical tool than, say, policy analysis or cost-benefit
analysis. But in combination with more traditional modeling
approaches it could be a useful aid to regulatory decision
making. The greatest problem one can foresee with the game
theoretic model is the relative arbitrariness of utility func-
tions and transition probabilities. But perhaps further
refinement will make it possible to bridge the gap between
the detailed but nondynamic decision model and the dynamic but
highly aggregated game models.
It is perhaps too bold to make recommendations to regula-
tors about ways to improve standard setting procedures on the
basis of what has been said so far. But regulators, as they
often told us during our research, have to make decisions on
the basis of what is available, even if the tools available
are still poor. Thus, rather than withdrawing into the com-
fortable and cautious attitude of saying that "no recommenda-
tions" can yet be made, we will try to extrapolate from our
research and state some of the principles that in our opinion
would be of value in standard setting procedures. What is
ultimately aimed at is a set of formal methods and tools for
standard setting embedded in the institutional regulatory
decision making process. Several steps in that direction are
possible.
First of all, in the pre-analysis phase of a standard
setting problem, i.e. when a problem has been recognized or
a task has been given to a regulator, an array of qualitative
methodological tools should be used to span the problem in
its widest perspective. In this pre-analysis phase approaches
like the policy analysis in connection with an analysis of the
legal requirements and constraints, and the political and
institutional context bounding the standard setting problem
could be helpful. Although a picture portrayed with such
analysis is necessarily qualitative, it may help to focus in
on a more precise problem formulation, and thus set the stage
for a more detailed analysis of a reduced standard setting
problem in which some pre-decisions about the nature of the
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regulation alternatives have been made.
In the task of information collection and evaluation,
regulatory agencies should be aware of their objectives and
force the researchers to collect data pertinent to the value
relevant consequences which are considered crucial for further
decision making. The regulator could impose format require-
ments for the presentation of research results to insure that
his information needs are better met. For example, require-
ments could be made to express ranges of uncertainty, best
guesses, and perhaps expert probability distributions as out-
puts of an analysis. This would also simplify the task of
research evaluation, although it would by no means solve it.
Research evaluation is still a major difficulty for which no
appropriate tools have been developed, and to which none of
the tools and models developed here address themselves directly.
However, evaluation technologies such as multiattribute utility
theory may be useful tools for the regulator to perform this
task.
To study the implications of the research results on
standard setting, a variety of approaches should be explored
simultaneously. Cost-benefit analysis, simulation gaming,
decision models, and game models are all possible candidates,
each of them having their own virtues :and limits. They have
one thing in common, however: They attempt to organize the
information and evaluation task in a way which otherwise would
have to be done through intuitive decision making. By thus
externalizing different ways of information processing and
evaluation in standard setting tasks, the regulator may receive
new insights into the sensitive points of the standard setting
problem, bottlenecks, and, perhaps, additional information
needs. Such models can never substitute for good judgment
and decision making, but they can clarify and provide a basis
for commun~cation. This may be particularly important if the
regulator wants to explore the effects of standards on differ-
ent interest groups. A possible procedural way to connect
these models in a practical way to regulatory decision making
is by "standard setting laboratories", in which representatives
of the various interest groups can interact through models.
Not much has been said in this report about the actual
implementation of procedures, models, and ultimately standards
within the institutional and organizational framework of
regulation. It is clear that new methodological approaches
would require new institutional mechanisms. Other approaches
could perhaps make use of science courts or of public partici-
pation in regulatory decision making. We do not yet know how
to achieve the crucial match between the institutional and
methodological aspects of standard setting procedures. But
the search for such a match may become a major future research
task in the further development of procedures for the estab-
lishment of standards.
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